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Introduction 
In studyine the historical bac}:c;ro"lmd of the Italo-
C::.nf'lict sevcrc.l things nust be tc'::cn into consid-
l<'irst, '\'le should heLve some Ul1d·-rs t211ding of the 
:LthiopLm .!)coples, their lwl'i ts, I'< ciel chn·t·~cteristics m1d 
civilizc_•,tion ru1.U.. Ll~30 their .:_Jsycholot;ical o.tti tudes. uuch 
I 
iJ:nonlcdcc cilllEot be obtc.ined frau trc.veller;..:; v;ho have only 
:91:'.scecl through the country or lived there C'- fey,- cle.;ys. The in-
. f'orLo.tion nerreted in the first chapter is therefore dravln 
fron 2:11 thors V!ho have li vccl in the coun tr::r for E\sny yer~rs and 
are o: hl'_::nt r:.uthol'itios on the subject. :Jecondl;<{, son1c kl1o'i'r-
i lcclc;o of EthiopL:m his tor~{ is c ssen tiel. Only outs t811cling 
1 events and tre\di tions cn11ld be to1whed u:.1on. 
I 
i 
:i 
1'he strugcle for "\J11if'ic8_tion during the last century 
i toc.;ethor ni th the strug~·:le 1Jetvlecn rivn.l clP5mDnts for the 
throne, 011d c:t':;'.'orts to l::CC}) from bein[; [;01)' led_ UJ) b;;{ buro-
})COll no.tions have been briefly tl'c::_,ted. The rcicns of the 
.I eL:.Jerors 'l'heodore, Lenelik, Lej Yr"su 2nd Haile 0elc.ssie are 
briefly considcrccl. 
Abyssinia 1 s dispute y;i th Italy c;revr out of Italian 
CXll['nuionist policies L1 east Africa nnd Abyssinia's distrnst 
. of Italy. The discussion of thec~e lead to the problem of 
this the:JiG o.,:=:; folloTIS: mud treaties had Itnly 811d Ethio})ia 
'Cl1terecl into? Who had failed. to fulfill her pc.rt? What 
; "richts 11 did ItcLly h~'Ve in Ethiopia? Wlw.t tre:::.tics hod. the 
=~u.ro ~1con pov:crs entered into with each other concerning 
vii 
II l;thiopia? llha t part did_ the I-ea.r:;ue of Hat ions plc.y in the 11 
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:! Italo-Ethiopinn dispute, and how vms the disrmte hEmdled? Did 
!J Italy proceed against Ethiopia as the Leabl'l1e of Nations 
I 
,I Covensnt :prescribed :procedUJ:'e aeainst 2~ Le8.£,"Ue l.:cmber? 
:I In answering these g_uestions, the various forei&L 
'I in tercsts i:n AbyssiEia must be co:c'lsjd_ercd, f:dno her inter-
:,1
1 natione.l sto.tus, the e:rms tro.ffic, slavery and last the llo.l-
vml incident nh:ich Itcly used as a })retext for her military 
I 
:I 
:j attack on Ethjopia. 
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CHAPTER I 
ABYSSINIA: THE LAND .Aim THE PEOl)LE 
Abyssinia, or Ethiopia as the official name is, is 
I I' an inland country and em-pire of northeast Africa lying chiefly 
between 5 and 15 degrees Ho:r·th latitude and 35 and 42 degrees 
East longitude. It is thus in the same l2.ti tude as Venezuela 
and Central .America in the Western Hemis:phere. It is bounded 
on the north by the Italian colony Eritrea, on the west by the 
.Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, on the southwest and south by Ugenda and 
' Kenya, on the southeast and east by British, Itali211 and French 
Somaliland. Abyssinia has thus for decc.des had b'uro:pe 's great-
est military powers for next door neighbors, and her position 
has been that of a gir2ffe surrounded by a lion, a tiger and a 
jaguar, each eyeing her and wishing to make her its prey, but 
not daring to make the s:oring for fear of the other two. 
Boundary disputes with her neighbors, France, Encland 
and Italy, have frequently occurred, but have generally been 
amicably settled. Tribal raids with -oillage ancl killings ho.ve 
o ~:~·ten taken })lace from one country in to another, as is char-
acteristic of African tribes. 
In the north, the country is about 230 miles wide 
from east to west, but broadens out southwards to 950 miles 
along latitude 8 degrees N. The old Ethiopian empire con-
sisted of the following provinces (listing them from north to 
south): Tigre~ Amhara, Gojam, and pro~t of Shoa. ~bese pro-
, vinces together with the rest of Shoa, Kaffa and Galla-land 
t: 
I 
--·---:~ 
I' 
1. 
form a highland plateau, and a geographical unit. This plat-
eau is surrounded by vast tracts of low-lying deserts of which 
Abyssinian Somaliland is the largest. The whole empire con-
tains about 350,000 square miles. In the north its border is 
about 40 miles from the Red Sea, but increases to 250 miles 
as it runs southward. 
The highlands rise abruptly from the desert and form 
extensive table-lands from 6,000 to 10,000 feet above the sea, 
diversified by mountFins and river gorges. The chief rr.nge of 
mountains forms a crescent about the large central Lake Tana of 
which considerable will be heard in subsequent chapters. The 
highest mountains reach an altitude of 15,000 feet, and are 
alvrays covered with snow. The eastern mountain ranges for 
some 600 miles have an altitude of 7,000 or 8,000 feet. No 
volcanoes are Jmown to exist but almost everywhere are numer-
ous evidences of past volcanic action. 
The uplands usually slope northwest and nearly all 
the large rivers flow to the Nile. The three largest ones are 
named the Takkaze, the Abbai and the Sobat. The most famous 
river is the Abbai or Blue Nile which arises in the Gojam high-
lands and flows almost due north for 70 miles to and through 
Lake Tana and then in a great semicircle turns east, south, 
west r'nd northwest and empties into the Nile proper at Khartu.m. 
There is little drainage into the Red Sea. The 
largest river, the Hawash runs toward it in a winding course 
for 500. miles but loses itself in the desert some seventy miles 
from the sea. 
2. 
Lake Tana is 5,690 
ength is forty-seven miles, its greatest breadth forty-four 
iles and it covers ap'~roxima.tely l,lno sq:uare miles. Some 
idea of the enormous amcmnt of water leaving this lake will be 
'1ad v1hen one hears that the avera{':e yearly r~' infall in the ~eana 
catchment is estimated at three rnd one q_ueTter feet, and 
the volume of v1ater (entering and leaving the lake) is between 
·six and seven billion cubic meters. The attempts to utilize 
the lake as a reservoir with the object of regulating this 
1
supply of water for irrigation purposes in the Sudan and Egypt 
~vill be discussed in a later chapter. 
The country is very picturesq_ue, and seems as if 
~roken up and tossed about; the rnountt~ins are abrupt and pre-
lcipi tous, the passes few and difficult, ru1d the scenery ·wild 
land fru1tastic. 
Europeans who have travelled. in Abyssinia trt'ive e;ra:ph-
ic descriptions of the rou:::,hness of the country; thus Leo 
r
• Roberts in the National Geogral)hic l,l.agazine says: 
''This is rough country. To-night I have an u.nob-
~tructed view in every direction of a succession of deeply 
1
eroded stream courses, wooded valleys, t<:~ble-lends, and the 
!smaller, t'la t-top})ed mesas known to the Ethic pians as amb2.s. 
ITher-e are many of the gray ou. tliers of r ir:i rock; sheer cliffs 
1
jo in steepsided valleys deeply .indented with minor drainage. 
!Side ravines are close together; terrain more dif'1'icu.l t to 
!traverse than canyon country of the United States, differences 
of elevation being greater. General tine is brown snd gre.y; 
ho timber. Cold winds fake this barren land seem all the more ~reary and desolate •11 1) . 
11· . Lieutenant-Colonel Han. H. D. Napier in his memoirs 
of his father, the conqueror of Magdala, describes p8.rt of the 
1) Travelling in the Highlands of Ethionia, Sept. 1935, p. 298 
3. 
==~==============================================~====-
journey to that city thus: "The route now lay over another pass, 
followed by a drop of 3,000 feet to Lake Ashangi. A soldier's 
remark: 'If you call this table-land, then the table is upside 
down and we are going up and dovm the legs,' caused Napier 
much amusement •• o 
"The following day the force had to cross a pass of 
over ten thousand feet, and a few days later attained to a 
height of eleven thous:=,nd feet on the Wadela Plateau. This 
was the terri tory of Wagshun Gobaze." ( 1) 
The climate of Abyssinia is as various as its sur-
face. The Somaliland and Danakil lowlands are hot and dry, 
with semi-desert conditions; the lower basin of the Sobat is 
hot, swampy and malarious. But over most of Abyssinia, as well 
as the Galla highle.nds, the climate is delightful, healthy and 
temperate; at high elovrtions it e;ets cold with chilly wina_s, 
much resembling the Al1)ine climate o The mean ranre of temuer-
ature is between sixty and eighty degrees. In addition to 
1
variation in climate with elevation, the year may be divided 
into two main seasons, the dry season from October to mid-June 
and the rainy, caused by the southeast monsoon, from mid-June 
to the end of September. There is also a period of so called 
"little rains" generally about March. 
The seasons in Abyssinia are more marJced than in 
many other np..xts of the world,· end irnJ7lec1 ia.tely after the rains 
cnmr,ence there j_s a change from the dull brovvns, greys, and 
re(lS of the forest, field and fell, to vivjd and tender greens 
of all shades, and this sudden alteratjon in the colors of the 
landscape is more maxked in the provinces of Tigr~ and Amhara 
1 
in the north· and center, than in the open windswept do1ms of 
I . 
[Shoa in the southern portion of the kingdom. 
I 
1
1
1) Field Marshall Lord Napier of Magdala, p. 228 
4. 
In the v~:olleys and lowlr:mcls vegetation is dense, but 
the plateaus are com:pa.ratively bare, with thinly scattered 
trees and bushes. The glens and ravines are often thicJ:::ly 
wooded, and offer a delightful contrast to the open dovms. In 
the south the u~land vegetation is more luxuriant xhan in the 
north. The date palm, mimosa, wild olive, giant sycamores, 
j1mipers and laurels, the myrrh and other gum trees, a magni-
ficent pine, the fig, orange, lime, pomegranate, :peach, apricot, 
banana and other fruit trees; the grape vine, blackberry, rasp-
berry; the cotton and indigo plants, and occasjonally, the 
sugar cane are found. There are in the south large forests 
of valuable timber; and the coffee plant is indigenous in the 
Kaffa country, ·whence it t:~kes its nome. 
One of the foremost authorities on Abyssinia, 
l.i:r. A. B. Wylde, for many years resident of the country and 
late 11vice-consul for the Red Sea District 11 , has this to 
say of the flora Bnd fauna of Ethiopia: nMany of the hapT)iest 
days of my life have been spent in the unlonds of Abyssinia, 
enjoying the ever varying scenery of moU11t8in, valley and plain, 
looking at the lovely flowers, plants and trees, the birds with 
their gorgeous plumage, the animals and the butterflies, moths 
and insects, many of them being unknovm in other countries. 
No day ever seemed to be too long nnd I lrn.ow of no country 
that would repay the bo tenist, naturalist, geologist or artj st 
better, than a year passed collecting and studying the varied 
objects to be met with.u llJ 
The domestic animals consist of horses, cattle, sheep, 
goats, C8lllels, mules and asses. Mules, cBmels, and asses are 
the usual beasts· of burden. Vast herds of oxen are met with 
throughout the country. The wild animals are the lion (not 
abundant), elephant, hippopotamus, rhinoceros, crocodile, 
( 1) ~-~dern Abyssinia, p. 3. 
5. 
buffalo, hyena, leopard, boar, antelope, zebra, quagga, gir-
affe, gazelle and civet. The buffalo is extremely ferocious; 
serpents are not numerous. Bees are numerous, honey being a 
general article of food. Locusts often lay the lsnd waste, and 
the tsetse fly is destructive to cattle during the rainy 
season. Agriculture is the chief industry but is still in a 
primitive state, the soil belonging theoretically to the im-
perial government and the idea of landed property being little 
understood by the natives. The soil is exceedingly fertile 
and in the lower regions corn, durra, wheat, barley, rye, 
teff, pease, cotton and sugar cane are grown. Teff, a kind of 
millet with pinhead grains, is the common bread grain. 
"Hailstorms are a mens.ce; 11 continues Mr. Roberts in 
his article in the National Geographic, "often the stones are 
so large that they cripple mules in a caravan. They usually 
occur in December and January. Early months of the dry sea-
son are called 'false spring' by natives. I saw the ground 
a foot deep with hailstones that did not melt for two days." (1) 
The exports from Ethiopia consist mainly of hides and 
skins, including leopard and moru{ey skins, coffee, wax, ivory, 
civet, and native butter. The imports are mE1de up largely of 
sheeting, cotton yarns, arti~icial silk, corrugated sheets and 
bars, hardware, cement, kerosene, gasoline, glass r.nd salt. 
England, Fronce, Italy, India, Germsny, Japan, and the United 
States sup~ly most of the imports. 
There is onl~r one railroad in Abyssinia, completed 
in 1917, and connectin-g Addis Ababa, the ca~)ital, with the sea-
port of Jibuti in French Somaliland. It is.about 490 miles 
long. All traffic not token care of by this road must be 
-(-1) Op. cit., p. 299 
6. 
carried by caravans over roads that are mere tracks. Only in 
the vicinity of Addis Ababa are there several miles of metalled 
roads, besides those constructed by the Italians during 1935-
1936 for campaign purposes. 
The chief mineral products are iron, sulnhur, coal, 
salt and a little gold, but they are as yet undeveloped. Coal 
is found in Shoa, but little used. There is a national bank in 
Addis Ababa, but the governor of the National Bank of Egypt is 
its president, and its governing body sits at Cairo. The 
Italian government will probably change this. The current 
coin of Ethiopia is the Maria Theresa dollar and the Menelik 
dollar worth about 48 cents. Salt bars and cartridges are also 
accepted as currency. The metric system of weights and mea-
sures is used. 
The population is made up of a heterogeneous collec-
tion of races - Coptic, Arabian, Jevdsh and Negro. The pol-
i tic£d ascendan!3y has long belonged to a race which calls 
itself Ethiopian and is of Arabian descent. This people speaks 
a dialect of the old Ethiopic language which is of the Semitic 
linguistic family. The Abyssinians were converted to Chris-
tianity in the fourth century by Frumentius (circa 300-360J, 
a native of Phoenicia, ·who thus became the founder of the 
Abyssinian church. 
He was consecrated its first bishop in 329 by Athan-
asius, the celebrated archbishop and saint of Alexandria. The 
Ethiopians are still members of the Alexandrian church and con-
seq_uently are Monophysites. The head of the church, the Abm1a, 
7. 
I 
is always a Copt, appointed by the Patriarch of Alexandria, 
but his power is shared by a native dignitary who controls the 
monastic orders. Jews are common and date from very early 
times. They are called Falashas. 
Previous to the Italo-Ethiopian war of 1935-1936, 
Ethiopia was an absolute monarchy. There are no reliable fig-
ures as to population, but the latest estimates indicate about 
seven to ten million inhabitru1ts. The Abyssinians, proper, 
number about three million, and inhf'bit the former kingdoms of 
Tigre~ Amhara, Gojam and part of Shoa, or about one third of 
the entire country. 
Authorities differ as to whether the Abyssinians are 
of negroid or of .:>emitic origin. Thus Leo B. Roberts s.c,ys: 
"Ethiopia, Abyssinia to many, is a non-negro empire in north-
eastern Africa ••• n{l) 
Augustus B. Wylde leans to the Semitic theory, but 
admits Hamitic intermixt1ITe. "From all the present data that is 
av~ilable, it will be found that it is imr,ossible to determine 
who were the original inhabitants of Ab;yssinia. The present 
race, as the name Habesh or Abyssinian denotes, is a mixture un-
doubtedly of very long standing, but most likely of Jew with the 
inhabitru1ts of southern Arabia and the non-negro races of east-
ern Africa. At present there are many Abyssinians that show a 
negro type, but this can be accounted for by either the father's 
or mother's ancestors belonging to that race, or more recently 
by an Ab~rssinian having obtained an illegitimate child from 
some negro woman. Color may ari~e)from many reas,;ns, namely 
altitude above the sea ..• " t2 
One more authority, C. F. Rey, should be quoted on 
this interesting subject; ":Many theories have been advanced in 
:-------------
1 l) O;p. cit., ;p. 297 
.12) Op. cit., p. 16 
II 
8. 
the many works that have treated o:f the subject (of the origin 
of the Abyssinian race); but without going deeply into it I 
think I may safely venture to say that the modern Abyssinian 
is compounded of three races: that he is probably originally 
derived :from one o:f the two great :families sharing possession 
of northern and northeastern Africa, i.e., the Hamites; that 
he has been strJngly Semitici~ed by successive waves o:f Semitic 
invasions from Arabia; that a Nigritic element has been intro-
duced by intermarriage with conquered tribes of negro orj_r::in; 
that such evidence as is obtainable tends to show a sirilarity 
between certain branches of the Abyssinian race and the 
pre-dynastic Bgypti:ans; and that accordingly there is some 
indication that they wei·e settled in parts of the country as 
long ago as 5000 B.C. But as to when they migrated or whence 
they came, I will not venture an opinion; the cradle of the 
Hamitic race is unkno\'m and vlill prob:..~bly remain so. 11 l) 
As regards religion, some are Christian, some are 
Moslem and some are Pagan. The Danakil are Mohammedans. The 
Gallas are the darkest, the least civilized and the most war-
like. The foreign population is made up largely of Indians, 
Arabs, Armenians and Europeans. 
"Few institutions o:f a religious character could be 
more picturesque than the National Church of Abyssinia,n says 
the author just quoted, "but when that has been said little 
more can be advanced in its fav:")r. It has been alleged by a 
recent visitor to the country that 'Ethiopian Christia..11i ty is 
o:f a kind which Dean Stanley described as hardly capable of 
going lovmr vri thout ceasing to be Christianity', and I am not 
prepared to qur:rrel with the statement. Yet such as it is, it 
is exceedingly rich and powerful and its influence is still 
very strong to-day; and great as is the part played by various 
forms of religious belief in shaping the destinies of many 
countries in the world, few, I think can have affected a coun-
try's history as much as in .AbJssinia. 11 {2J 
There are three main reasons for Ethiopia having for 
so long retained its independence and escaped partition among 
European governments: its early acceptance and long maintenance 
of Christianity (1600 years), the impregnable nature of its 
1) The Real Abyssinia, p. 198 
2) Op. cit., p. 174 
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mountain fastnesses, and the warlike character of its people. 
The Abyssinians vary in type, but may on the whole 
be described as a fine type of man. C. F. Rey says, u •• about 
medium height, well built, brovm in color, shading in some dis-
tricts to olive. More technically, it may be said that as a 
result of anthropological examination by various experts of a 
large number of individuals, 73% were found to be bronze 
skinned, 13% fair, and 14% df~k, whilst practically all had 
brovm eyes and black hair. ( J 
The characteristics of the Abyssinians have been the 
object of many bitter attacks by people who have lived there a 
short time or have not lived there at all; but those who have 
lived there a long time are as a whole kindly disposed to them. 
Thus A. B. Wylde says, writing in 1900: rrThere is no harder 
worker than the Abyssinian peasant, and no more harmless and 
hospitable person when left alone and properly treated; and no 
more truculent, worthless, conceited, lazy and useless individ-
ual than the Abyssinian soldier, who formerly did nothing but 
prey upon the defenceless cultivator. Circumstances are now 
altering all this ••• I have been well received everywhere, 
where I have travelled without an escort, and instead of find-
ing the Abyssinian countryman reticent Emd shy, have found him 
entirely the reverse ~d glad to impart and seek information 
on many subjects. rr ( 2J 
C. F. Rey, who has "wandered over its mountains, re-
velled in its scenery and climate, resided in its curious cap-
ital, knovvn the Emperor in his present (1934) capacity and as 
Ras Tafari, the Regent, rubbed shoulders with(its governors and 
people, studied its customs and conditions, 11 3) expresses 
himself thus: ni am bound to say that my impressions were of 
the hap1)iest, and during the whole of our sojourn in the coun-
try neither my wife nor I experienced even discourtesy, far 
less hostility, from the many Abyssinians with whom we came in 
contact, high or low, either in Addis Ababa or during our 
'treks' about the country. Politeness and courtesy, indeed, are 
in my view striking characteristics of these people, and in 
1) ~·, p. 37 
2) Op. cit., pp. 3,4 
3) Op. cit., p. 13 of introduction. 
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this opJ.nJ.on I am supported by other travellers who had( ~eater 
opportunities than I of putting the matter to a test. 11 J.J 
The Abyssinians are intensely fearful end jeolous of 
any encroachment on their inde-:1endence, and are as a race in-
tensely proud and patriotic; 11 proud of the independent position 
they have maintained during centuries of ceaseless warfare; 
1 proud of the alleged semi-divine descent of their ruling house, 
in which theybelieve implicitly; proud of their religion, 
which they have preserved through 1500 years against attacks 
of all descriptions. A striking example of this is contained 
in l.Ienelik 1 s circular letter to the l'owers in 1891, in which 
he refers to 'Ethiopia having b'een for more than fourteen 
centuries an island of Christians in the midst of a sea of 
pagans. 1 
11 They are deeply suspicious of foreign enterprise, 
as portending danger in some form or other to their indepen-
dence. They are mildly religious in their ovm curious way, 
observing the church fasts and feasts with the greatest strict-
ness, end showing, outwardly at all events, a considerable 
measure of reverence to their churches and monasteries. They 
are entirely uneducated, but possess a keen sense of hunor, are 
very loquacious, and are fond( of litigation, in which they 
indulge freely. 11 C. -F. Rey 2) 
They are great sportsmen and are very fond of hunt-
ing or of any sporting event, to watch which they will flock 
in thousands. They appreciate and respect a strong man, and a 
good sportsman. They make admirable and scrupulously honest 
servants, but are incorrigibly wasteful. They are markedly 
!cruel, especially to animals, and their punishments are 
attended with circurr,stances of almost barbarous cruelty. It 
would hardly be truthful to say that they are industrious, al-
though the peasBnts could truly be described as such. The 
others take more kindly to carrying a rifle than to manual 
1) Ibid.' p. 39 
2) Ibid., P. 41 
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labor. The lower classes have little or no idea of morality, 
and brothels and drinking dens are plentiful in the towns and 
well frequented. Venereal and dirt diseases are very prevalent; 
so also are smallpox, leprosy, and blindness. Mentally they 
may be said to be a remarkable combination of astuteness and 
childishness, attributable no doubt to the medley of conflicting 
conditions in which they live. 
It may at first seem quite 1.mnecessary to give such a 
detailed report of the Abyssinian land and peo:ple, but sub-
sequent chapters will show that her mom1tains, lakes, resources, 
institutions, civilization and government all play an important 
part in her relations with the European Powers whose colonies 
touch her borders. 
12. 
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CHAPTER II 
AN OUTLTI~E OF ETHIOPIAN HISTORY 
Li~e so many other kingdoms, Ethiopia has a legendary 
and an historical origin. The legendary, of course, precedes 
the historical. The legendary history begins with. the visit of 
the Queen of Sheba to King Solomon as related in 1 Kings 10 of 
the Old Testament. This recorded visit is no doubt historical, 
but the question is whether the .Sheba of the Old Testament is 
l t~e Ethiopia of to-day; some historians hold that Nubia is meant, and others that the Sheba of First Kings was a kingdom 
embracing territory on both sides of the Red Sea. The latter 
view is probably the correct one. 
According to the legend, the Queen of Sheba heard of 
King Solomon's splendor through a merchant of Makeda, Tamrin by 
name, who brought red gold, sapphires, and black wood that 
could not be eaten by worms to the Judean king. These marvelous 
reports of Solomon's wisdom and riches made the queen decide to 
see for herself. So she set forth with a grev.t caravan of 
gifts, and arriving in Jerusalem :presented herself to King Sol-
omon, who entertained her honorably. She stayed six months 
and then determined to return home to her kingdom. Through 
some stratagem Solomon connived to have "lawful" intercourse 
with her, and the Queen v,rho had been a virgin, conceived. The 
chronicler is here at some pains to justify the polygamous 
habits of Solomon, which, he explains, were not due to lust 
but to the desire to raise up many sons who would inherit the 
lcities of the heathen and destroy their idols. ~~e Queen had 
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already abandoned the worship of the sun, moon and stars, and 
worshipped the God of Israel. She returned home and in due 
time gave birth to a son whom she called Menelik. When this 
boy had reached man's estate, he was sent to his father in Jer-
usalem to be further educated. He stayed a few years and then 
returned to Ethiopia, taking with him a number of the young 
nobles of Israel, first born sons, who were to be councillors 
and officers; also the Ark of the Covenant, which he secretly 
purloined from the Temple. When the theft was discovered Sol-
omon pursued him with an army into Egypt, but on learning there 
that Menelik and his retinue had passed through there 11many 
days before" he despaired of pursuing them further and returned 
sadly to his capital. The the1't of the Ark was kept secret from 
the people, who still believed it reposed in the :Most Holy 
Place of the temple. 
It needs hardly be seid that this legend, of which the 
/ 
above is a greatly condensed res1m1e, is entirely a:pocryphal. 
The peoples of the Ethionian terri tory were pagans dovm to the 
fourth century A. D. Three principal motives for the invention 
of this legend are fairly plain. The first vvas the desire of 
the Abyssinian people to prove their ancient origin. Parvenu 
peoples, like parvenu individuals, hanker after ancestors, snd 
peoples have as little scruple in forging family trees as have 
individuals. When the Abyssinians came in contact r.i th the 
civilization of the Christian East, they de aired to find a 
place for themselves in its ancient history. The only histor-
ical literature which the Abyssinians possessed was the Scrip-
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tures, and so they searched the Scriptures for allusions to 
themselves. They knew that the Greeks called their· country 
Ethiopia. In the Scriptures they found that Ethiops was the 
son of Ham for in the Septuagint, Cush is rendered Ethiops. 
They therefore proudly adopted the name of Ethiopians, the 
name by which they call themselves to thi.s day, thus affiliat-
ing themselves to Noah. 
Their choice of an ancestor was not altogether for-
tunate, for there is no doubt that Ethiops with all the de-
scendants of Ham falls under the curse of Noah, that he shall 
be a slave. An affiliation with the more honorable house of 
Shem was clearly desirable. 
It is at this point the second motive comes into play. 
God had given great Messeanic promises to .Abraham, Isaac, and 
Jacob. These the Jews had forfeited by rejecting the llessiah, 
and the Christian church became heir to these promises. But 
this spiritual interpretation failed to satisfy many simple mind 
who craved a literal fulfilment of the promises in favor of the 
blood descendants of Abraham. It was therefore only necessary 
to give the Queen of Sheba a son by Solomon to link the blood 
royal of Ethiopia with the house of David. .And to make the 
matter more complete the Ethio:n.ian nobility were made descend-
ants of first born nobles of Israel, and the Ark, the visible 
sign of Jehovah's :presence among his chosen people, was trans-
ferred to .A:x:um. We need not smile at these cunningly devised 
fables. Right in our own land and in Great ~ritain, are 
preachers who travel up and dovm the land, and who ought to 
15. 
know better, who declare that the Saxons are the ten lost tribes 
of Israel and the British Em~ire the promised kingdom. 
The third motive can more easily be detected: it is 
the desire of the royal house of Ethiopia to assert its divine 
right to the throne. By tracing their descent to Solomon, the 
line of Christ, the kings of Abyssinia invested themselves with 
an aura of divinity. Revolt against them was sacrilege, for 
were they not the cousins of Christ? 
~Vhe date of the origin of the legend can not be -
traced with any :precision, but it probably lies somewhere near 
the eleventh or twelfth centuries A.D. 
The first historical glimpses of Ethio9ia come to us 
from the third century B.C. Ptolemy II and Ptolemyiii sent 
Greek admirals to explore the western coast of the Red Sea in 
order to o:pen up trade with the coast lands, but more partic-
ularly to capture African elephants to be trained for military 
pur:ooses. The next mention of Abyssinia is in the Periplus 
of the Erythraean Sea, a description of the coasts of the Red 
Sea and the Indian Ocean, written in the latter half of the 
first century of the Christian era. And our next item of in-
formation comes from a curious source, The Christian Cosmo-
graphy of Cosmas. Cosmas was a merchant ·who sailed the Red Sea 
and the Indian Ocean in the early sixth century A.D. In his 
declining years he retired into a monastery and devoted the re-
mainder of his days to writing a book to refute the impious 
~agan theory that the world ·was spherical in sha~1e and prove 
that it was in fact a flat oblong, twice as long from east to 
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west as it was broad from north to south. In a personal anec-
dote he relates that while he was on a visit to Adulis the King 
of .Axum sent orders to the Governor of Adulis.to copy two an-
cient Greek inscriptions in the tovm. The governor reg_uestcd 
Cosmas to do this for him, and they were subseq_ucntly published. 
in the Christian Cosmography. One of the inscriptions dates 
from the period when Adulis was a Ptolemaic station and records 
the exploits of Ptolemy III. In the other an Abyssinian king 
recounts his numerous warlike expeditions - -mostly directed 
against peoples of Tigre, and sometimes farther afield. 
Space will not permit a detailed account of Ethiopian 
history dovm through the centuries; only outstanding events can 
·be touched upon. It was mentioned that Christianity v1as intro-
duced in the fourth century by Frumenti us. In the sixth cen-
tury the Abyssinians cong_uered the rich province of Yemen in 
Arabia and were in constant communication with the outside 
world for over fifty years. The Mohammedan cong_uest of' Egypt 
in the seventll century completely isolated them, however, and 
for centuries afterward the kingdom continued in a distracted 
state, now torn by internal commotions, and now invaded by 
external enemies - - mostly Mohammedans and Gallas. 
Towards the close of the fifteenth century, the Por-
tuguese missions into Abyssinia began. A belief had long 
prevailed in Europe of the existence of a Christian kingdom in 
the far east, whose monarch was Jmovrn as Prester John, and 
various expeditions had been sent in quest of it. Among others 
who had engaged in this search was Pedro de Covilham, who arrive 
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in Abyssinia in 1490, and believing that he had at length 
reached the far-famed kingdom, presented to the negus or em-
peror of the country, a letter from his master the King of 
Portugal, addressed to Prester John. Covilham remained in the 
country, but in 1507 an Armenian named Matthev.; was sent by the 
negus to the king of Portugal to request his aid against the 
Mohammedans. In 1520 a Portuguese fleet v1ith l1latthew on board, 
entered the Red Sea in compliance with this request, and on em-
bassy from the fleet visited the negus, Lebna Dengal or David 
II, and remained in Abyssinia for about six years. One of this 
embassy was Father Francisco .Alvarez, the chaplain, from whom 
we have an interesting account of the country. Alvarez's 
account is of high value, not only as the first description of 
Abyssinia by a foreigner, but as the only description of it in 
its medieval glory before its civilization was wrecked by the 
Moslem and Galla invasions. 
Between 1528 and 1540, armies of l:ohammedans, under 
the renovmed general Mohammed Gran, entered Abyssinia from the 
low country to the southeast, and overran the kingdom, oblig-
ing the emperor to take refuge in the mountain fastnesses. In 
this extremity recourse was again had to the Portuguese, who 
sent a fleet, under the command of Stephen da Gama, from India, 
which arrived at lvl.assawa, in Fed. 1541. In the July following 
a force of 450 musqueteers, under the command of Christoffer 
da Gama, younger brother of the admiral, left the fleet and 
marched into the interior, and being joined by native troops 
were at first successful against the enemy; but they were sub-
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seq.uently a.efeated, and their comT"ender tBken prisoner e..nd -put 
to death August 1542. On Feb. 21, 1543, however, Mohammed 
Gran was shot in an engagement and his forces totally ro·uted. 
After this, quarrels arose between the negus and the Portuguese, 
who now wished the emperor publicly to profess himself a 
convert to Rome. This the emperor refused to do. Gibbon in 
his Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire describes the strug-
gles which followed in Chapter 47, last paragraph. It is too 
long to be quoted in full, but it describes how efforts were mad 
by force of arms to introduce the Roman Catholic religion, how 
the inquisition was introduced and the Deople's liberties 
taken away. "The Jesuits themselves deplore the fa tal inclis-
cretion of their chief (Alphonso Mendez, the Catholic Patriarch 
of Ethiopia), who forgot the mildness of the Gospel and the 
policy of his order to introduce with hasty violence the 
liturgy of Rome and the inquisition of Portugal. He con-
demned the ancient practice of circumcision, which health 
rather than superstition, had first invented in the clirra te of 
Ethiopia. A new baptism, a new ordination, was inflicted on the 
1 
natives; and they trembled with horror ·when the most holy of the 
I dead were torn from their graves, when the most illustrious of 
1 the living were excommunicated by a foreign priest. In the de-
fence of their religion and liberty the Abyssinians rose in 
arms, with desperate but unsuccessful zeal. Five rebellions 
were extinguished in the blood of the insurgents: two abunas were 
slain in battle, whole legions were slaughtered in the 
field, or suffocated in their caverns; and neither merit, nor 
rank, nor sex, could save from an ignominious death the enemies 
of Rome. Eut the victorious monarch was finally subdued by the 
constancy of the nation, of his mother, of his son, and of his 
, most faithful friends. Segued listened. to the voice of pity, o 
reason, :perhaps of fear: and his edict of liberty of conscience 
instantly revealed the tyranny and weakness of the Jesuits. On 
the death of his father, Basilides expelled the Latin patriarch, 
and restored to the wishes of the nation, the faith and the 
discipline of Egypt. The Mono:physite churches resounded with a 
song of triumph, 'that the sheep of Ethiopia ·were now delivered 
from the hyenas of the West'; and the gates of that solitary 
realm were fo:reve:r shut a,ga)inst the arts, the science, and the 
fanaticism of Europe." ~.I.. 
~) Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 
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This quotation shows that the Abyssinian distrust of 
foreign enterprize is not without foundation in their :past 
history; and they have particular reasons for being distrustful 
of Roman Catholicism and Jesuitism. 
The above mentioned expulsion of the Jesuit priests 
took :place in'l633, and after that the kingdom gradually fell 
into a state of anarchy, which about the middle of the eighteent 
century was complete. The negus received no obedience from the 
provincial governors, who besides were at feud vdth one another, 
and severally assumed the royal title. The whole history of the 
country is, in fact, with a few bright intervals due to the 
efforts of some of the more enlightened monarchs, one gloomy 
record of internecine wars, barbaric deeds and unstable govern-
men t·s, of adventurers usurping thrones, only to be them-
selves Ul~seated, and of raids, rapine and pillage. Abyssinia 
thus became divided into a number of :petty independent states 
and, save for visits from occasional explorers such as James 
Eruce in 1769, remained shut off from the world until the 
nineteenth century. 
KD~G THEODORE 
The period from 1770 to 1870 has been called "the 
struggle between the great chiefs". About the middle of the 
nineteenth century it looked as if one of these chiefs, Kassa, 
should succeed in resuscitating the unity D.nd :po·wer of the 
ancient kingdom. Kassa was born about 1818 and was the son of 
a minor chief in Kwara and reputed to fuelongtto the Queen of 
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Sheba's royal line. He had a checkered childhood and youth; 
his ~ather had died early and his mother became so poor as to 
be obliged to sell Kousso(a drug advocated in Abyssinia as a 
specific ~gainst tapeworm) in the streets of Gondar. On the 
death o~ a relative, Kassa became the lePder of a band, o~ free 
companions, seized large tracts of terri tory in Dembea, married 
the daughter of Ras Ali, the Emperor, was con1'irmed in his 
ovmership o~ the lands he had seized, defeated Egyptian attacks 
·on the country, quarrelled with, fought and defeated his power-
ful father-in-law, and captured and installed himself in Gondar, 
the capital of the country. After a short breathing space he 
took the field again, defeated the rulers of all the various 
1
states or kingdoms in the country ·vfi th the exception of Shoa, 
and in 1855 was crowned King of Ethiopia at kcum under the 
tame of Theodore. He succeeded in being recognized by the 
Great Powers of EuroTJe. 
Shortly after his coronation he absorbed the kingdom 
of Shoa, hardly a blow being struck owing to the death of the 
king, Haile Melikot. He took back vri th him in to ca:ptivi ty 
Haile :Melikot 1 s son, Sehala Mariam, the boy who was later to 
become the greatest ruler Abyssinia has ever known, Menelik II. 
Theodore introduced European artisans, and went to 
•mrk wisely in many ways, but developed traits of character that 
soon ruine.d him. From being an abstemious, continent ru1d 
clean living man he became addicted to habits of drunkenness, 
immorality, arrogance snd cruelty, which estranged him from his 
hvm countrymen; whole districts rose in revolt against him. 
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The young Sehala Ms.riam escaped and :proclaimed himself' King of 
Shoa. 
In 1862 Captain Cameron arrived in Abyssinia as min-
ister for the British Government, and successor to Walter c. 
P1ov;den who had been murdered. Cameron had with him a letter 
to King Theodore from Queen Victoria, tharucing him for ran-
soming Plowden's body. Writing as one Christian sovereign to 
another, Theodore suggested to the Queen and to the Emperor 
Napoleon an Abyssinian embassy to Great Britain and France 
respectively. Through an oversight this letter was pigeon-
holed, so when dispatches arrived from .England early in 1864, 
theodore at once asked for the answer from Queen Victoria; 
there was none. He took this as a gross :personal insult to 
himself and to his nation. His wrath burst like a bomb on the 
head of' :poor Cameron, who with certain other Englishmen was 
throvr.n into prison. l~atters were not improved when the British 
Government sent a Levro1tine, Mr. Hormuzd Rassam, to obtain the 
release of the :prisoners. In 1866, obeying a sudden whim, 
Theodore seized Rassam also, and :placed him and some sixty 
other Europeans in iron anklets and fetters. He then locked 
both consignments of prisoners into his fortress at Magdala. 
To obtain their release, an army of about 16,000 men 
under Sir Robert Napier was dis:Pa.tched from Bombay in 1867; it 
lande(l at Zulla. in the Gulf' of Aden in January 1868, and after 
marching four hundred miles besieged l'Lagdala, Theodore's cap-
ital, which was taJcen by storm April 13. Theodore was found 
among the dead, the general opinion being that he had shot 
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himself. 
The inhabitants and troops were subsequently sent awa 
the fortifications destroyed and the town burned. The empe-
ror's;widow Queen Terunish died soon afterwards, and their son 
Alamayahu (:the.,bnly legitimate son of Theodore) was sent to 
England for his education according to the wishes of his late 
father. He studied at Rugby, but died in his nineteenth year, 
on November 14, 1879, and was buried at St. George's Chapel, 
Windsor. 
Napier made no attempt to settle the succession. 
Among the political prisoners who were set f'ree, was the glut-
tonous old emperor John III, who had lived for years in captiv-
ity, and who pleaded for restoration to the throne. Napier 
wisely turned a deaf ear to this request. His object had been 
the rescue of the captives, and, this achieved, he bee;ro1 his; .. :;; .. 
~ : 
march back to the coast. His only spoils iVere a gold chalice, 
the abuna' s crown, the gold crown of King Theodore, and the 
royal copy of the Kebra Nagast. This last was a book contc.ining 
the law of the whole of Ethiopia, and the names of the princes 
and churches and provinces. John IV, the successor of Theodore, 
found that his subjects ·would not recognize his authority with-
~.ut this book, and in 1872 wrote a pathetic request to Lord Granville to have it returned. The trustees of the British iuseum moved by his plea, restored the book to the King. Theo-
ldore 's crovm was returned to Abyssinia by King George V in 1925, 
the bearer being Ras Tafari (Haile Selassiei). The chalice is 
in the Victoria and Albert Museum in London. 
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CHAPTER III 
EUPEROR MENELIK II 
Napier left Abyssinian territory at the end of May 
1868, and it should be mentioned that his success was in no 
small degree due to the aid afforded by several native chiefs 
through whose country he passed both to and from Magdala. Fight-
ing immediately broke out among the chiefs of the different 
provinces, the three most powerful being Ras Kassa of Tigre, 
(the successor of Theodore) who had to start the conquest of 
the unhappy country all over again, Gobasie of Gojam, and 
Sehala :Mariam, or Meneli~ of Shea. During one of Theodore's 
orgies Menelik had escaped from his captivity and had returned 
to Shoa and re-established himself on the throne. 
After much fighting Ras Kassa forced practically the 
whole of .Abyssinia to recognize his claims to be Negus Negusti, 
and was crovmed as Emperor under the name of Johannes or John 
in January 18'72. The new emperor was as brave as Theodore and 
possessed his virtues, but none of his vices; but he was never 
given an opportunity to show his ability to develop the country, 
because of his untimely death. He defeated both Dervishes and 
Egyptians, who had thought the moment opportune to make inroads 
on the country; and it was during his reign that a favorable 
treaty was made v1ith Great Britain in 1884. 
Menelik, however, revived his pretentions to the em-
pire of Ethiopia shortly after John's accession, and prepara-
tions for the inevitable hostilities were commenced on both 
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sides. John marched his forces to the attack, but when the two 
armies drew near one another matters were arranged without 
fighting. John confirmed Menelik in his Kingdom of Shea, and 
crowned him with his ovm hands, but forced him to acknowledge 
his suzerainty; this agreement vvas contained in a Treaty dated 
March 4, 1878. Further, by the marriage of John's son to 
Menelik's daughter and an agreement that this son should suc-
ceed John as King of Kings, it was hoped that the succession 
difficulties had been overcome. 
Eut John's son died, and when John himself was killed 
in battle against the Dervishes in March 1889, Menelik, who had 
been continually intriguing against John with the Italians and 
otherwise, once again claimed the empire of all Abyssinia for 
himself, and so strongly had he consolidated his position that 
he was able to cause himself to be crowned as Emperor under the 
name of Menelik II at En toto in November 1889. This remarkable 
. 
man gave us Abyssinia as it was at the turn of the century. 
He consolidated the various kingdoms composing the empire, sub-
duing the Gallas in the east, south and west of the country, 
thus almost doubling the size of the empire by the addition of 
huge territories. He attempted to introduce European ideas on 
quite an extensive scale, such, for example, as the railway 
from the coast, and many roads. 
His victory over the Italians at the battle of Adowa 
in 1896 secured Menelik in his :position, and enabled him to 
devote his energies to the consolidation and extension of his 
power. He gradually overcame all resistance, and when, in 1901, 
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King Tekla Haimanot of Gojam died, Menelik's authority over 
Abyssinia was complete. 
:Menelik was a type belonging rather to the western 
business world, a :pure-bred, hard-headed entrepreneur. He was 
keenly interested in foreign affairs, ana.. his knowlea..ge of the 
a..evelopments of European :progress is commented on by almost 
every foreign visitor to his court. He even had. advanced ideas 
about social reform, and a..ecreea.. the abolition of slavery, the 
introduction of compulsory education, and the substitution of 
a new coa..e for the old customary law. No doubt these would 
have been more effective had he :personally supervised their ex-
ecution. As it was he was usually too busy consolid.ating his 
frontiers; few of his subjects grasped the significance of his 
ia..eas, and any benefits a..erivea.. from the changes lapsed in the 
turbulent years of his illness and of Lej Yasu's short, event-
ful reign. Some of his reforms were :permanent, such as the 
postal system, the electric light and telephone, which followed. 
with the French railway, ana.. was installed. in the :palace at 
AB..dis Ababa as early as 1903, and the vaccination mark to be 
seen on almost all Abyssinians to-day. 
During his reign foreign Missions :pourea.. into Abys-
sinia, and foreign Legations were established. at Addis Ababa by 
all Great Po\·mrs; bouna..ary and other treFties were concluded, 
and he received numerous honors from foreign governments. Un-
fortunately he was seized with a :paralytic stroke in 1908, and 
from then until his death on Dec. 12, 1913 he was :practically 
hors a..e combat. 
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Menelik had married the Empress Taitu (as her fifth 
husband, and his fourth wife) in 1883, but had no children by 
her. He had, however, had three children by his previous unions 
a son who had died young; a daughter Shoaraga, who married Ras 
:Mikhael, and who had one son Lej Yasu; and another d~:mghter 
Zaud.itu. 
Lej Yasu was of a very different stamg from his grnnd-
father Menelik, clever but dissolute and irresponsible. He had 
been nominated as Menelik's successor under the Regency of his 
tutor, Ras Tessama, a very enlightened man who most unfortun-
ately died in 1911, it is said by poison. His place was taken 
by a council of Jliinisters who voted Lej Yasu old enough to act 
for himself under their guidance, and for two years before 
Menelik's death he was in an invidious position, res~:onsible 
but without power. 
According to C. F. Rey, 11 A protracted diplomatic 
strugsle had been taking place between the Empress Taitu, Ras 
Tessama, and some of the leaciing Rases between 1908 and 1913, 
and the nomination of Lej Yasu was alleged by some to have been 
due to the efi·orts of the Empress Tai tu, in order to maintain 
power in her own hands as he was a mere boy, and by others to 
the Rases at that time assembleti in Add.is Ababa, against the 
vrishes of Queen Taitu." (1) 
The Empress Taitu was a shrewd woman of nearly sixty, 
vastly fat, but stptely and very dignified, with a reputation 
for bravery gained by lea.d.ing a regir·ent in person, against 
some rebels in Tigre in 1902. At first, she WPS anxious to 
get the Rases to recognize Zauditu, Menelik's daughter by an 
earlier ·wife, as heir to the throne in place of Lej Yasu. She 
rightly recognized her as infinitely the more al) le o:f the tvm. 
·1) Op. cit. , p. 218 
But she did not play her cards well, made a bad mistake in 
trying to obtain the regency and succession for her ovm fam-
ily, and seemed too friendly to Germany. 
Meanwhile Lej Yasu's character developed from bad to 
worse. He strayed off with a small force into the Shankalla 
country tovmrds the Nile plain and there began the parctices 
which were his dovmfall - - the gradual adoption of the l~oslem 
faith. He also entered into a series of temporary 11betrothals 11 
or rrmarriages 11 with Moslem girls in the :province of·Gimirra. 
During the World War he endeavored to assist both the Ger-
mans and the methodically 11ad Mullsll, and even negotiated with 
the latter for marriage vri th his daughter. He wore the l~o slem 
turban ancl scimitar, :put av1ay his Christian wife, and started 
a harem. He claimed he was descended from l'ohammed, not Sol-
omon, and ordered tvro moslem fakirs to :produce a genealogy 
:proving this. Finally, he :presented the 1'urkish Consul-gen-
eral with the green, red and gold Abyssinian flag embroidered 
with the crescent and the device, uThere is no God but Allah," 
and declared the country subject to the religious rule of 
1'urkey. 
Two groups in Addis Ababa viewed his doings vd th 
alarm. The first were the foreign legations who foresaw that 
he might become a :pov.rer to be reckoned with should his Galla-
Moslem combination succeed; and if he should become a :powerful 
Ras wholesale massacres of Christians and Jews woulo_ be sure 
to follow, which might have untold repercussions in important 
war areas. British, French and Italian troops were moved to 
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strategic points, Berbera, Jibuti and J.iassana. 
The second anxious tS,Toup were the Sho an Rases. In 
September 1916, Lej Yasu went dov.n to Jigj iga in the southern 
lowlands to collect an army for his holy campaign. The Shoan 
chiefs at once massed their forces r:Uld marched into Add.is Ababa 
where they demanded of the abuna that he should release them 
from their or,th of allegiance to Lej Yasu. They deposed Lej 
Yasu on Sept(;mber 27, 1916, and nominated lienelik' s daughter 
2audi tu empress in his stead, vli th Ras Tafari, son of Ras 
liiakonnen of Harrar and a grand-nephew of J1ienelik, heir apparent 
ru1d Prince Regent. The abuna then excommunicated Lej Yasu. 
Zauditu vvas crovmed on Feb. 11, 1917. Next day Ras 
i1oldo Giorgis was proclaimed Negus, for Ras Tafari, being only 
t·wenty-five, was thought too young for the honour. Lej Yasu 
/ 
fled first to the Dankali country and later to Tigre, but was 
captured by government troops in 1921. The easiest and most 
natural way to get rid of him vrould have been by execution, 
but a decree of Menelik's ruled that no prince of the blood 
should suffer capital punishment. Zauditu, therefore, turned 
"' him over to Ras Kassa of Tiere for safekeeping. He was bound 
in the golden chains befitting his royal rank, and remained 
in captivity until his death under somewhat mysterious circum-
stances in the fall of 1935, after the outbrea1c of VTar bet·ween 
Italy and Ethiopia and when the Italian Armies on the southern 
front were approaching his place of confinement. 
The succession and position of the royal family pre-
vious to the Italian ConQuest of 1935-1936 is shovm in the 
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table at the close of the chapter. 
liENELIKT S TREATIES 
Before leaving the subject of }.:enelik, it will be 
well to maJce an outline of the treaties by vvhich this remark-
able emperor consolidated his frontiers. These treaties, par-
ticularly those with Italy, have figured in the discussions 
arising out of the dispute of 1935-1936 between Italy and 
Ethiopia. 
1) 
2) 
3) 
1) :March 1897: · Treaty with France regarding French Som-(1) 
aliland frontier. 
2) May 1897: Treaty vlith Great Britain (Rennell Rodd 
Treaty) regarding British Somalilond frontier. This 
left Harrar and Ogaden in Abyssinia but afforded Brit-
ish Somaliland tribes moving inland in search of pas-
turage the right to use certain wells and grazing 
(2) 
grounds in those provinces. 
3) 1897: Agreement with Italy regarding Italian Somaliland 
frontier. (This treaty was never published, but is 
mentioned in the frontier treaty of 1908, number 8) 
below.) 
4) July 1900: Treaty with Italy regarding Eri trean 
(3) 
frontier. 
Sir Edward Hertslet, The Map of Africa b~ Treat~z Vol 
p. 421 (third edition) 
Ibj_d.' p. 423 
-
Ibid., p. 460 
-
II 
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5) May 1902: 1Teaty with Great J3ri tain regarding Sudan 
(4) 
frontier. 
6) May 1902: Treaty vd th Great J3ri tain a11d Italy regard-
( 5) 
ing Sudan-Ethiopia and Sudan-Eritrea frontiers. 
7) Dec. 1907: Agreement with Great Britain regarding J3rit-
(6) 
ish East African frontier. 
~) May 1908: Convention with Italy regarding Somaliland 
{7) 
frontier. 
9) Ma.y 1908: Convention with Italy regarding Eri trean 
( 8) 
frontier. 
The complications arising out of some of these treat-
ies, especially those governing the Italian Somaliland frontier 
(numbers 3 and 8) will be discussed in a later chapter. 
As we proceed with the discussion of the Abyssinian 
~roblem, we shall notice that many elements of this problem 
!have grown directly out of the situation Menelik created. In 
spite of his important concessions to the ambitions of his 
~eighbors, he permitted economic penetration by friendly powers 
'only, a11d even on these he kept the closest watch. 
The contacts of Abyssinia with European powers are 
the contacts of a medieval society with modern ways. Ethiopia's 
.4) Ibid., :p. 431 
5) Ibid.' :p. 433 
6) Ibid., :p. 445 
7) OJ2. cit., Vol. III, :p. 1223 
8) Ibid., :p. 1225 
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rulers must at one and the same time maintain their ovm author-
ity, and adapt their peoples to the pressure of the outside 
world. That world has appeared in the guise of European Em-
pires endowed with all the devices rdf Government, and the in-
veterate habit of eating up African nations. It is small won-
der that Abyssinia has tried to preserve her liberty by a pol-
icy of exclusion. 
The European Powers, on the contrary, have always 
felt the pull of two motives. Abyssinia has been an uneasy 
neighbor, whose outlying tribes have conducted scores of slave 
raids in the territories of these powers. Secondly, the coun-
try has 'resources' which means possibilities for money making 
by white men. Each of the three powers would have liked to ex-
ploit some, at least , of these resources, but each was un-
willing to let the others gain a monopoly of them. Better an 
Ethiopian Abyssinia than a French Abyssinia to Britain, or an 
Italian Abyssinia to France, or a British Abyssinia to either. 
Hence the string of treaties with their duality of significance. 
There is a common confusion of thought about these 
treaties. Agreements about concessions and spheres of influence 
made between Britain, France and Italy, are quoted as though 
they were binding upon Abyssinia. That, of course, is not so. 
The non-fulfilment of such m1 aim may be a disap~ointment, but 
neither legally or morally does it constitute a grievance. Ex-
cept where she has directly entered upon a treaty obligation 
with the pow·er concerned, neither Dri tain, Frnnce, nor Italy 
has any nrights 11 in Abyssinia. 
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THE ROYAL HOUSE OF ABYSSINIA 
SAHALE SELASSIE (1795-1847) 
King of Shoa, Ifat, and the Ga1las,1813-1847 
HAILE 11:ELEKOT, 1825-1855 
King of Shoa, 1847-1855 
MENELIK II, b. 1844 
King of Shoa, 1866 
Emperor, 1889 
m.Taitu, 1883 who died 
leaving no children. 
Three children by 
previous marriages. 
I 
son dau. Zaudi tu 
(died young) b. 1876 
Empress, 1916 
d. 1930 
4 other children 
dau.Shoaraga,m.Ras :M.ikhael, m.2nd 
Ruler of wife 
~lloGal~ 
dau. Tanina Worke 
m. Shanabit 
Ras :Makonnen 
d. 1906 
Lej Yasu Wazero Sehin 
b. 1896 
Emperor 1913-1916 
d. 1935 
From C. F. Rey, The Real Abyssinia, p. 220 
Wazero M anen 
I 
Crown J?r.Asfa Wassen,b.l916 
m.l912 
Tafari Makon / 
en, b.l891 
Regent & hei 
1916, 
King, 1928 
Emperor 1930 
2 sons 
3 dau. 
CH.AJ>TER IV 
EMPEROR HAILE SELASSIE I 
Haile Selassie or Ras Tafari MaJconnen as his given 
name is, was born July 17, 1891, the son of Ras Makonnen of 
Harrar, who died in 1906. At the age of seven he was sent to 
Europe to be educated, but according to some of his biograph-
ers, despite his western training, he remains predominantly 
Oriental even though he believed in the westernizing of Ethio-
pia to a limited extent. After his father's death in 1906 he 
left Harrar for Addis Ababa where he continued his studies in 
the European high school founded by Emperor Menelik. The lat-
ter made him a Major-General and in 1909 he became governor of 
Harrar. In 1912 he married Waizaro (:Princess) Manen, a grand-
daughter of Ras Mikhael, and his ovm distant cousin. They 
, have six children, three sons and three daughters. 
' 
Difficulties between the Empress Zauditu and Ras 
Tafari, the Regent, owing to the reactionary tendencies of the 
former and the progressive policy of the latter tended to para-
lyze Tafari's efforts and to grow in intensity, until on Nov. 
7, 1928, the Ras, as the result of a minor coup d'Jtat, caused 
himself to be proclaimed as King (Negus) with most of the royal 
po·wer in his hands. This cou;p d'etat was made possible by the 
death of the old irascible and fire-eating war minister Fir-
aurari Hapta Giorgis, who had been fully as powerful as the 
regent and the Empress. With the aid of loyal troops which he 
succeeded in putting in strategic positions before anybody else, 
Ras Tafari secured the dead man's governorships for himself 
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and his nomin~es~ and also obtained the banishment of a leading 
trouble maJcer, the etchegie, who as head of all the monastic 
orders was equal in influence to -the abuna himself. Next he 
further consolidated his position by bringing Dejasmatch Balcha 
to book. The Empress was powerless in the face of this degree 
of control, and in 1928 gave her consent to Ras Tafari's cor-
onation as Negus. Zauditu was left with the nominal rank of 
Empress, but she died shortly afterwards on April 3, 1930. 
Nov. 2, 1930 Tafari Makonnen was crowned Rmperor, or King of 
Kings (Negus Negusti) of Ethiopia at Addis Ababa amid scenes of 
great splendor in the presence of royal and other visitors 
from most of the European countries. It is the custom of Ethic-
pian Kings when crovmed to take a new name. Tafari chose the 
name Haile Selassie, which means "Power (or Hero) of the 
Trinity". 
He is described as a small man ·with 8l1 olive com-
plexion, bushy black hair, and a pointed beard; and is regarded 
as being exceedingly shrewd. He had ten brothers and sisters 
all of whom died in childhood, and he himself rather miracu-
lously escaped death on several occasions. Once when boating on 
LaJce Aramaya the boat capsized, drovming his six companions, 
he alone being saved. 
Simon :Mazade Roussan describes him in the Living Age, 
"Of small,slender, almost frail stature, Haile Selassie I is an 
enormous worker. Eating and drinking little, suffering from 
delicate health, he has a surprising capacity for work and an 
indomitable energy. His official day begins before seven in the 
morning and often lasts late into the night. During his ~irst 
audiences he receives reports, which he discusses with his 
advisers. His ~lear logical yet perfectly secret mind astounds, 
perplexes, and confuses his enemies, especially when they think 
34. 
==tl==============================tf====--
they have put him in a hole. His large, gentle, keen eyes fol-
low the smallest details of expression in the faces of his in-
terlocutors. His very small, fine hands resemble his face in 
that they are extremely gentle and nervous. Already Selassie 
I gives the impression that in ]mowing how to dominate others 
he knows first of all how to dominate himself. 
nsacrificing none of his occupations, stepping into 
the shoes of any minister who is absent or sick, the Emperor 
sacrifices several hours of slee:p to daily prayers. His most 
intense interest goes out to his country and to his second son, 
young Prince Makonnen, a chUd of twelve, full of courage and 
authority. One feels that the sometimes weary gaze of the· 
father is resting joyfully on his son's face and deriving im-
mense comfort from it. 
nFeared and loved as no sovereign in Europe is feared 
or loved, the Emperor of Abyssinia does not owe his prestige 
to a mysterious tower of ivory or ebony. Distant but familiar, 
mysterious but simple, Haile Selassie participates in the life 
of his people. 1\nyone can approach him and ask his rriercy, justice and aid. The monarch even attends festivals, at which 
anyone at all can bring forward supplications or invectives 
to heart's desire without running the risk of the slightest 
reprisal. Such lioerty might well surprise most citizens of 
our republics. 11 (1) 
Concerning his religious interests the Missionary 
Review of the World says: rr This Emperor, whose name means 
Hero of the Trinity is eagerly devoted to the furtherance of 
his people and is personally concerned that the Gospel have 
i'ree course in the country. The .Amharic people have been Chris-
tirols for 1600 years; but much of their religion is set in 
rigid forms, especially on account of the long isolation of the 
country. • While Haile Selassie is a faithful son of his ovm 
Coptic or Abyssinian church, he is eager to open it to Evan-
eelical inflences. He has been favorable to all missions •.• 
The emperor is a zealous suJ:rporter of the worlc of 
S:Preading the Bible in the new vernacular translation and he too 
:Part :Personally in the dedication of the beautiful building of 
the British and Foreign Bible Society in Addis Abr>ba. He him-
self :PUblishes Biblical books in two versions, the old sacred 
translation v,rhich is no longer understood by the IJeo:Ple and the 
modern which they can read. He explains all his vvork in a :Pre-
face with his ovm portrait. He sends out loads of these Bibles 
on mule-back to his leaders for the IJUr:Pose of distributing them 
among their :PeO:Ple •. He also sets a good exam:Ple to his people n 
the matter of church attendance, being at his(place every Sunday 
in the Church of St. George in the ca:Pital." 2) 
1) Abyssinia's Emperor, March 1935, pp. 38-40, Translated from 
Journal de Geneve, Geneva Liberal Daily 
2} :Mayl936, :P· 264 (Harrisburg, Pa.) 
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CHAPTER V 
THE PARTITION OF AFRICA 
:Mid-Victorian .Anti-Inperialism 
Before 1875 not one-tenth of Africa, the second larges 
continent in the world, had been ap:,:ropriated by the civilized 
nations of Europe. France had conquered Algiers, on the north-
ern coast, in 1830, and had annexed the surrounding region. 
Great Britain had tE1Jcen Cape Colony from Holland in 1806, during 
the Napoleonic Wars, and had annexed in 1843 the smaller and 
younger colony of Natal. Portugal had inherited historical 
claims to the region called Mozambique on the eastern coast, and 
Angola on the western coast. In addition, along the western 
coast there were a number of footholds, hardly more than trad-
ing posts, in the :possession of France, Great Britain, Portugal 
and Spain. 
A long list of intrepid ex])lorers had opened u:p the 
continent for conquest. In glowing superlatives they described 
the amazing fertility of Africa 1 s rich soil; with ready intui-
tion they divined the existence of minerals in fabulous abun-
dance. As regards commerce they were convinced of Africa's 
immense potentialities. 
One may wonder why the Great Powers had not earlier 
begun to partition this rich continent. The answer is undoubt-
edly the prevailing anti-imperialistic views held by leading 
statesmen in the Mid-Victorian age. Gladstone, John Bright, 
Lord Granville and Robert Lowe '\'Tere all anti-imperialists. At 
this time Great Britain refused annexation of colonies, when 
36. 
' 
annexation was even reQuested by settlers or natives. Natal, 
New Zealand and the Fiji Islands may be mentioned as specific 
instances. Not until annexation or :protection had been repeat-
edly requested was it granted and that by new and more im:per-
ialistic cabinets. 
In France the same anti-imperialist spirit prevailed. 
In forty-eight years since 18'77 (which year may be taken as an 
approximate dividing point between the era of anti-imperialism 
and the era of imperialism) the gafn in territory has been al-
most sixteen times as great as in the sixty-two years before 
1877. 
In Germany the all powerful Bismarck shared until 
about 1876, the anti-imperialist idea. In 1868 he v~ote to a 
colleague (von Roon): 11All colonial enterprise must be left to 
private individuals; all the advantages claimed for the mother 
country are for the most part illusions. England is abandon-
ing her colonial :policy; she finds it too costly ..• Germany 
1) 
has no navy and conflicts with other powers are inevitable." 
:Bismarck had already refused a protectorate over the 
Sultan of Sulu (in the Pacific); he like·wise refused Portugal's 
offer to sell MozambiQue (in Africa). When France offered 
Cochin-China and other colonies in lieu of Alsace-Lorraine after 
the French defeat at Sedan, :Bismarck scornfully refused colonial 
compensation, even though certain Bremen and Hamburg merchants 
l) A. Zimmermann, Geshicht~_der Deutschen Kolonialpolitik, 
(:Berlin 1914), p. 6. in :M~y--EvEil-yn Tovmsend, Origins of 
Modern German Co1oniali:sm (1871-1885), p. 1'7, (N.Y. Columbia 
University, 1921) 
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- favored it. He wanted no colonies he bluntly declared; their 
only use was to provide sinecures for officials; they were too 
costly a luxury for Germany. Many were the pleas, from a lim-
ited number of' interested merchants and travellers in the 
seventies, for the annexation of this or that overseas land, but (1) 
the stubborn chancellor rejected them all. 
It has often been said that Germany was born into the 
family of European nations too late to acquire her rrplace in the 
lsunn, her fair share of imperial possessions. In truth, however 
1Germany became a united empire, the most powerful state on the 
Continent, in ample time to participate in the imperialist world 
division of the eighties and nineties. It \'laS Bismarck's stiff-
necked and hard-headed opposition, and the strong free-trade, 
anti-imperialist convictions of the Reichstag majority, that im-
posed a handicap on German empire building. In the main, the 
German national mind during the early years of the empire did no 
regard with approval the adoption of an imperial colonial policy 
indeed it was distinctly opposed to any ide~:.1. of expansion overse£ • 
In no other country was so wordy a debate, so convulsive an inteJ-
~al struggle, required in the process of conversion to imper-
ialism. Theoretical writings had to be reinforced by mission-
ary activity, commercial and financial interests, intensive 
propaganda, and political pressure, before Germany was won over. 
~)SeeM. E. Townsend, Op. cit., pp. 17,18 
38. 
Imperialism after the 'Seventies 
The turning of the tide from anti-imperialism to im-
~erialism came in the 'seventies and 'eighties. It came because 
1
economi? and political conditions, and with them theories, had 
been profoundly altere<l since the middle of the century. 11'urope 
~as converted to imperialism by a combination of argu~ent and in-
terest, arising from an almost revolutionary alteration of econ-
omic and political conditions. 
]'our signal changes app.eared. First of these was the 
~aning of the comfortable supremacy which English cotton mills 
~d iron works had acheived by the inventions of the Industrial 
~evolution. As long as other nations worked with their hands, 
~~hile Englishmen worked ,.,i th machines and steam, England vras se-
pure from serious competition. .And other nations were slow to 
~nstall machinery. But during the last quarter of the century 
~he industries of Germany, United States and France and other 
pov1ers suddenly waxed mighty. Before the close of the century, 
the United States had won first place in the iron industry, 
vhile Germany was about to forge ahead of England into second 
~lace. Cut-throat competition also developed in the cotton in-
iustry, especially in foreign markets. But one bright ray of 
1ope, one solution, appeared- colonies in which goods from the 
~other country went in free while protective tariffs were ap-
Dlied on goods from other countries. This alone would give the 
iesire for colonies great impetus. 
The second great change in the economic vrorld, to be 
loted as an explanation of Europe's conversion to imperialism, 
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was the revolution in means of communication. Steamships, rail-
roads and telegraph made ~ossible the gigantic increase of col-
onial trade between 1870 and the present. 
The third economic factor was the demand of industrial 
nations for tropical and subtro~ical :products such as cotton, 
rubber, coffee, cocoa, tea, sugar, coconuts, coconut oil, phos-
phates, besides the ever present hunger of industrial states for 
coal, iron snd oil. Thus the northern world r s desire for trop-
ical products has been one of the conditions causing imperial-
ism. 
The fourth economic factor was "surplus capital". By 
11 sur:olus capital" is meant a superfluity too great for reinvest-
ment at home. Foreign and perhaps backward countries in need 
of funds desire loans at an attractive rate of interest. ~~e 
capitalists and bankers grant the loan. If the country fails to 
pay interest the bankers appeal to their ovvn government, which 
is not slow in rushing troops and warships to the defaulting 
country. Presently the country becomes a "protectorateu or a 
1 "colony" of the horne country. The need of the Great Powers for 
naval bases and coaling stations in various parts of the world 
should also be mentioned as a cause of colonial ambitions. 
A definition of nationalism and imperialism might not 
be out of place here. Nationalism means that people consider-
ing themselves similar in language, race, culture or historical 
traditions should constitute a separate sovereign state; imper-
ialism, on the contrary, means domination of non-European native 
races by totally dissimilar European nations. 
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The Scramble Begins 
The first Euxo:pean monarch to foresee the wonderful 
:possibilities of an African colonial empire was Leopold II of 
Belgium. He conceived the :project of forming a great state in 
the recently discovered Kongo territory in central Africa. On 
his initiative the"International African Association 11 was 
founded in 1876, with headquarters at Brussels, ostensibly to 
place the exploration and commercial development of Africa on 
an international footing. This 11 associationn finally resulted il 
the Berlin Conference of 1884, by which the Kongo Free State was 
established under the sovereignty of the Belgian King, and the 
general spheres of influence of the other Great Powers were 
defined. 
.. 
After the Franco-Prussian war (1870-1871) the unified 
German nation finally but slowly woke up to the desirability of 
a colonial empire, and succeeded in establishing a footing in 
East Africa. France having lost both territory and :prestige in 
Europe as a result of the war of 1870 sought compensation for 
her loss by colonial expansion. She completed her conquest of 
Algeria, and established a protectorate over 1Unisia. Great 
Britain was consolidating her influence in South Africa, Egypt 
and the Sudan, while Italy, recently having become a united 
nation also desired colonies, and obtained a foothold on the 
Red Sea. It is here in East Africa, with Abyssinia and eastern 
Sudan as the centre, that the struggle becomes most intense. No 
where did visions of empire struggle for mastery with greater 
intensity of conflict or a more colorful wealth of spectacular 
incident. 
The French Dream of Empire 
The colonial dreams of three Great Povrers now come 
into view. France was dreaming of a vast inland North African 
empire stretching f:rom the Atlantic to the Red Sea. Great Brit-
ain was dreaming of a Ca};le to Cairo railvmy (now realized) 
rUl1lling through British territory all the way; and Italy, whose 
dream was more modest, wanted to carve off the eastern tip of 
Africa, including Abyssinia and its adjoining coastlands for 
an Italian empire. As regards France, a glorious start had 
already been made. Beginning vli th Senegal in the extreme v'ieSt 
they soon added nahomey, just to the west of Nigeria, the Ivory 
Coast, and the regions now called French Guinea. ]'rom these 
scattered footholds on the coast, France rapidly pushed into 
the nhinterlsnd 11 adding the Niger valley and finally Timbuctoo 
on the edge of the Sahara, Mauretania, French Sudan and the 
upper Volta region~ All this terri tory is now called J!'rench 
West Africa. One remarkable feature of this conquest is that 
it was achieved by only a few thousands of Frenchmen. 
The southernmost French colony lying along the coast 
betvmen the Gabun and Congo rivers, was a part of what is now 
knovvn as French Congo. French explorers, pressed through·the 
hinterland north of the Congo river intending to extend the 
colony aro1md the rear of Germru1 Cameroons so as to co:rmect it 
with the French possessions in the western Sudan through the 
country aro1md Lake Chad. The British; however, encouraged the 
Germans to extend Cameroons inland to Lake Chad, thinking by 
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this means to cut the French off. Instead they provoked the 
French to bolder projects - the conquest of the central Sudan, 
east and north of Lruce Chad, and the invasion of eastern Sudan, 
which is the upper Nile valley. This produced a crisis, the 
description of which must be postponed till the English and 
Italian dreams have been outlined. 
The Italian Dream of Empire 
The Italian dream, as has been stated, was to carve 
out a colonial empire in East Africa. A fuller account of her 
proceedings is given in the next chapter, so only a few gener-
alities vdll be touched upon here. Italy, like Germany, 
achieved nationhood just before the imperialist world politics 
began. Unlike Germany, however, the new nation of Italy was 
industrially backward and politic ally weak. Although many 
Italian patriots, mindful of Rome's ancient grandeur, cherished 
imperial aspirations, the country was neither weak enough to be 
permitted by other Great Pov.,rers to acquire colonies which might 
be exploited by themselves, nor strong enough to risk the en-
mity of powerful neighbors. Iii th self -abnegation born of im-
potence, Italians looked on, furious but helpless, while im-
perialist :B'rance appropriated the most natural field for Ital-
ian expansion, Tunis on the African coast just south of Italy, 
the site of ancient Rome's vanquished rival, Carthage. Further-
more, there are almost fifty percent more Italians than :French-
men in Tunis. 
It was at the Congress of Berlin that the problem of 
Tunis had come up - not in open meeting but in secret conclave 
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and in hushed tones. The Bey of Tunis had borrowed extensively 
from European financiers, especially French, and like most 
oriental rulers being spendthrift, he was presently unable to · 
meet his obligations. A free hand in Tunis was offered France 
by Lord Salisbury, Lord Beaconsfield, and Prince Bismarck. 
This liberality on the part of England was necessary to buy off 
French opposition to the Cyprus Convention, and on the part of 
Bismarck because of a desire to reach some settlement of the 
Near Eastern problem on the basis of territorial cessions at 
the expense of Turkey, and in part because he was anxious not 
to estrange the French or drive them into the arms of Russia. 
In any case, M. Waddington, the French Foreign Minister, re-
turned home from the Congress with "Tunis in his pocket. 11 Oc-
cupation of the country was delayed, however, because Wadding-
ton found little sympathy for the venture in Paris. 
Count Corti, the Italian Foreign minister, had been 
his countryrs plenipotentiary at the Congress of Berlin. He 
had gone there with the hope that somehow or other Austria 
could be induced to make concessions in Italia Irredenta, the 
Trentino and ~~rieste. But Count .Andr~ssy, the Austrian Foreigr: 
Minister never had the slightest intention of ceding an inch 
of territory to the Italians. He had time and again offered 
them his support for aspirations in the l1Iedi terrane an, but the 
Italian government concentrated on the question of making 
gains in Europe and did not follow up the suggestions that had 
previously been made as to Tunis. The result was that Corti 
came back from the congress with clean but empty hands. The 
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indignation in Italy was so great that Corti was almost stoned 
in the streets and soon after resigned his position as foreign 
minister. 
Irredentist demonstrations in Italy soon caused the 
tension between Austria and Italy to reach the breaking point, 
while in Europe generally Italy was looked upon as a preten-
tious disturber of the peace •. nvlhy on earth should Italy de-
mend an increase in territory? 11 said a Russian diplomat to Bis-
marck. "Has she lost another battle?" This reference to Italy's 
repeated ill fortune on the field of war shows the character-
is tic mixture of irritation and scorn with which the other 
governments viev1ed the new kingdom. 
Regarding Bismarck's willingness to let France take 
Tunis, it appears that the German Chancellor took the view con-
sistently that it would be to Germany's interest if the French 
became involved in colonial enterprises and found compensation 
for their losses in Europe by acQuiring new territories in Afri-
ca. In other words, by diverting the activities of the powers 
to extra-European fields he would be able to reduce the pres-
sure on the continent. If, beyond this, the various nations cam 
into conflict on colonial issues, so much the better for Ger-
many. The danger of hostile coalitions would be reduced by 
just that much. So when the French ambassador, Count Saint-
Vallier, came to him in January 1879 to sound out his attitude, 
the German chancellor gave all possible encouragement. ttWell, 11 
he exclaimed, nr think the Tunisian pear is now ripe, and the 
time has come for you to pick it; the insolence of the Bey has 
acted like the August sun on this African fruit, which may well 
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rot or bi)stolen by another if you leave it on the tree too 
long." ( 
This very eagerness on the part of Bismarck acted as 
a deterrent rather than a stimulus upon the French Statesmen. 
They were more firmly convinced than ever that the German Chan-
cellor had some ulterior motive, and that his object was to 
sow dissension between France and Italy. Military action was 
therefore postponed and the occupation did not take place un-
til April and :May 1881. Tunis then became a French protect-
orate. 
By this "punitive expedition 11 France gained a fairly 
valuable colony. But she gained also an enemy. Great was 
Italian indignation that France should occupy the country of 
Hannibal. But she could do nothing, until she had allies suf-
ficiently powerful to bolster her claims. Grasping this fact, 
the then premier, Agostino Depretis, sued for the favor of Ger-
many, and, after difficult negotiations, obtained admission 
to a Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria-Hm1gary in 1882, 
the year after the French seizure of Tunis, The secret nego-
tiations between Rome, Berlin and Vienna, published since the 
Great War, reveal the depth of Italian enmity toward France 
(2) 
during the two decades that followed 1881. Germany and 
Italy agreed to fight together to prevent any further extension 
1.) Cf. William L. Langer, European Alliances ~md Alibments 
1871-1.890, pp. 220 f. (N.Y., Alfred A. Knopf 1931 
2) Alfred Francis Pribram, Secret Treaties of Austria Hungary 
passim. 
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of French imperialism in Northern Africa. When the Triple Al-
liance was renewed in 1887, Depretis' successor, the astute 
Francesco Crispi, obtained from Germany a secret pledge of aid 
in case France should attempt to conquer Tripoli or :Morocco. 
This bitter feeling ended about 1900. As the result of secret 
negotiations between France and Italy in that year, Italy 
agreed to let France conquer the independent empire of Morocco, 
if France would let Italy seize the ~'urkish provinces of Tri-
poli and Cyrenaica. The war of 1911-1912 between Italy and 
Turkey gained these two provinces for the former. 
Having been thwarted in his designs upon Tunis, pre-
mier Crispi now began to look elsewhere for a colonial empire. 
In 1889 the Italian consul at Zanzibar, Signor Filonardi, made 
the fortunate discovery that the chieftains or 11 sultans" of the 
Somali coast cherished an ardent desire for Italian protection. 
To this long Somali coast, stretching for 1200 miles north-
ward from British East Africa to the eastermost tip of the 
continent at Cape Guardafui, Signor Crispi laid claim. The an-
noying fact that part of the coast belonged to Zanzibar ( a 
British protectorate) was disposed of in 1892 by Italy's leas-
ing the coast for an annual rent of 160,000 rupees. This is thE 
so-called Benadir Coast. 
As the reward of his enterprising patriotism, Sig-
nor Filonardi obtained, for a compe.ny which he organized and 
controlled, the privilege of governing and exploiting the new-
ly acquired lands, while the Italian Government retained the 
privilege of paying the annual rent to Zanzibar and an annual 
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subsidy to Filonardi's company. Despite subsidies the company 
lost so much money that another company was formed to take 
charge. Their subsidy was to be circa 200,000 lire in addition 
to the rent due Zanzibar. These are striking examples of im-
( 1) 
perialism conducted for private profit at public loss. In 
1905 the Italian Benadir Company finally transferred its hold-
ings to the Italian Government. Since then Italian taxpayers 
have more or less cheerfully, because unwittingly, paid sever-
al million lire a year to meet the deficits on a colony large-
ly desert, while a private company headed by his Royal Highness 
the Duke of Abruzzi invested millions in the irrigation of a 
small area for agricultural colonization. 
The Somali coast colony was, however, only a part of 
Crispi's dream. He had his eyes also on the barren Eritrean 
coast on the Red Sea, but especially on the mountain empire of 
Abyssinia, which lay as a jewel unworthily set in valueless 
brass, or rather as a fruitful oasis surrounded by deserts. 
The Dreams of Great Britain 
It was inevitable that if France was seeking an em-
pire in North Africa stretching from the Atlantic to the Red 
Sea, and England seeking one that should stretch from the Cape 
to Cairo, a clash of interests would be bound to occur some-
where. It came also - in the Sudan - and the whole affair from 
heginning to end is p_articularly complicated. "Despite the im-
mense literature on the subject and the undeniable excellence 
of much that has been written upon it," says Professor Langer 
of Harvf'rd in his valuable work The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 
l); Cf .- WoD;t.f,. Leonard, Empire and Commerce in Africa, pp. 174-17 
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11no study has yet treated it adequately in all its multitudin-
ous as?ects. Its complexity is simply baffling and the many 
contradictiQns on all sides only serve to enhance the con-
fusion.11 (1} In brief outline the story is as follows: 
The French dream of empire in North Africa has al-
ready been outlined. From the west they had already gained 
most of the northern continent as far as western Sudan. To 
complete the realization of their dream, French imperialists 
needed a few million square miles in Eastern Sudan, the Nile 
valley, and Abyssinia. These secured, the French empire would 
stretch from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea, from the Med-
iterranean to the Gulf of Guinea. They already had a foot-
hold on the Red Sea called French Somaliland. Here they had 
built a harbor (or rather naval base) by the to\vn o~ Jibuti, 
and were planning to connect it vli th the Nile by a railroad 
through Abyssinia. Railways are always the steel girders of 
empire. 
The realization of the French dream naturally pre-
sented a fev; difficulties, but they did not seem insurmountable. 
One was the British occupation of Egypt, consented to by a some-
what weak and timid ]'rench cabinet in 1882. But Gladstone had 
said that the British would evacuate Egypt, when it v·vas safe to 
do so. The upper Nile valley, kno'~ as the Eastern or Egypt-
ian Sudan, vn:s held by fierce .Arab tribesmen, and .Abyssinia's 
hardy. mountaineers would not be eB.sily conquered, but, at any 
rate, no rival European :power had :possession. 
Another difficulty was that Abyssinia was coveted by 
1) Vol II, p. 573 
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Italian imperialists, whose modest asyiration was to carve off 
the eastern tip of Africa including Abyssinia as an Italian em-
~ire, small beside that of France ond England, but satisfying 
~o national pride. Having naturally begun on the coasts ac-
quiring Eritrea and Somaliland, they hoped to push into the 
~byssinian hinterland. Their start was not particularly aus-
tpicious. The first to\m obtained in Eritrea (on the Red Sea) 
~as Assab, ~1couraged by England for reasons that will pre-
f3ently appear, the Itali::m government now :proceeded to install 
~arrisons in neighboring towns, occupying several hundred miles 
pf hot and sandy coast with a haste inspired partly by fear 
~hat France or Russia might tru{e it if given time. Soon the 
Italians came into conflict with the Abyssinians. In January 
1887 an Italian garrison was slaughtered by Abyssinian soldiers 
~ear the village of Dogali. Nothing so stimulates imperialism 
as the killing of Europeans by natives. Furious for revenge, 
the Italian :parliament voted five million dollars for a :puni-
tive ex1>edition, and a strong army was :prepared to fight Abys-(1) 
~inia. Before :proceeding with the drama j_t vrill be neces-
~ary to set the stage more completely. 
When African or Asiatic territory is being acquired, 
lmgland is not often vrilling to be left out of account. In this 
pase, British imperialists had a vital interest in thwarting 
li'rench as:pira tions and encouraging Italy. On the bulk of Abys-
~inia, Britain had no design; it could more safely be left to 
1----------------------------:rr~cf,, Leonard Woolf, Empire and Commerce in Africa,:p:p.l53-156 
or Thomas Parker :Moon, Imperialism and World Politics, 
:p:p. 141,142. 
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Italy than to aggressive France. But the upper valley of the 
Nile, that is the eastern or Egyptian Sudan, would be an in-
dispensable link, if the Cape to Cairo railroad were to be 
realized. The Sudan covers a territory of almost a million 
square miles between the Sahara and the equatorial jungle region 
It consists of fertile uplands, dense forests, swamps and 
steppes. 
The northern or Egyptian Sudan was the country that 
ancient Egyptian emperors had conquered, ro1d whence they had 
got their slaves. Here in the nineteenth century Arab slave-
traders did the same nefarious business, which the English 
tried to stop. Here an .Arab f8.natic, Mohammed Ahmed, who 
claimed to be the divinely inspired 11:Mahdi 11 or guide to revive 
Mohammedanism and expel the Europeans and Egyptians, sowed his 
seeds of fanaticism. .An Egyptian army sent a.gainst him was 
utterly annihilated. Gladstone, who had occupied Egypt in 1882, 
and therefore felt a measure of responsibility for the Sudan, 
decided to evacuate and sent General Gordon with a handful of 
troops to Khartum to arrange for the withdrawal of Egyptians 
and Europeans. "Chinese" Gordon offered liberal terms - too 
liberal in fact to such notorious slave-traders - but the der-
vish forces closed in on Gordon, cartured Khartum and killed 
him in January 1885. His frantic appeals to England for re-
inforcements had not been heeded Ul1til too late. 
A fearful :period of misrule ensued for unhappy Sudan. 
Slave-trade, fire, sword, plague and starvation decimated the 
population under the rule of of Uohammed .Ahmed and his successor 
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Khalifa Abdulla. England hesitated to intervene against such 
formidable foes, so the Sudan consequently remained actually 
independent, and - France viewed it as a prize to be taken by (1) 
him who could first lay hand upon it. 
The Drama Begins 
The drama now begins. The English, unvvilling to un-
dertake the conquest of the Sudan, yet fearful lest France 
might gain in Abyssinia a base of operations against the Sudan, 
decided to use Italy as a pmm in the com}Jlicated international 
chess game. Italy was to be encouraged in her desire for Abys-
sinia, to forestall France. 
The Italians consequently made friendly overtures to 
Menelik, who was then a local chieftain, but aspired to usurp 
the imperial throne. They promised him support in his aspir-
ations, presented him with five thousand Remington rifles, and 
signed with him the celebrated Treaty of Ucciali (May 2, 1889). 
The trouble .Article seventeen of this treaty soon gave will be 
dealt with in the next chapter. 
England then in 1891 signed two conventions with 
Italy, drawing a "line of demarcation in East Africa between 
·the spheres of influence respectively reserved to Great Brit-
ain and Italy," and leaving to Italy all of Abyssinia as far 
west as the meridian 35 degrees East of Greenwich. It is sig-
nificant that this line safeguarded for England the Egyptian 
Sudan, including the valley of the Wnite Nile and most of the 
l)Cf. Sir A.W. Ward & G.P. Gooch, The Cambridge History of 
British Foreign Policy, Vol III, pp. 176-184 & P. T. Moon, 
Op.cit., pp. 142-144 
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lue Nile, a generous territorial corridor leading from Egypt 
to Uganda and East Africa, a necessary link in the Cape to 
Cairo chain of possessions. In what way the diplomats of Eng-
land and Italy, two of the six European Great Powers, were en-
titled to sit down at a table and mark out on the ma:p vast areas 
as spheres of influence reserved for themselves, is a question 
•;hich may be left to the subtle juristic mind. To the historian, 
the :point of interest is that in Paris this Anglo-Italian 
rangement was considered altogether high handed and unjust-(1) 
ifiable. 
For three years ]'rench imperialists seemed to pay 
ittle attention to these conventions, but in 1894 two events 
ook :place which heightened French indignation. One was the 
ri tish acquisition of Uganda as the result of Captain Lugard' s 
x:plorations in that country, and his activities in England; 
he other was the signature, May 12, 1894, of an agreement be-
ween England and King Leopold of Belgium, by which the latter, 
s sovereign of Congo Free State, received a lease of the Bahr-
1-Ghazal district (in the southeastern :part of Egyptian 
return for a perpetual lease of a corridor of terri-
ory, 25 kilometers wide, running from Lake Albert Edward to 
(2) 
ake Tanganyika. The last gaps were being filled in, to com-
the Cape to Cairo empire. The British already had :pushed 
frontiers north from Cape Colony to Lake Tanganyika; the 
orridor leased to them by King Leopold would enable them to 
1) See British and Foreign State Pa~ers, vol.83, :p.l9; vol.86, 
p, 55. 
2) Ibid., vol. 86, p. 19 
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establish communications, ~ning between Congo Free State and 
German East .Africa, as far north as Uganda; Uganda in tUTn v;as 
now British; and by the Anglo-Italian conventions, the Sudan-
ese territory extending north from Uganda to Egypt was a Brit-
.ish sphere of influence. 
To their chagrin and amazement, French iiTperialists 
could see the British plan working itself out before their 
eyes. .And its success meant that the :B'rench dream of ocean 
to ocean empire was shattered. The disappointment was all the 
more maddening, because the Bahr-el-Ghazal, leased by King 
Leopold, was just the district they expected to get in order to 
connect French Congo with the Nile valley. 
In order to checkmate England, the French took two 
moves. They ,:first protested vehemently against the Anglo-
Belgian treaty, and then, secondly, began to cultivate the 
friendship of Emperor Jvlenelik o:f .Abyssinia. 
A grave crisis arose on accom1t of this treaty. All 
the Great Powers felt concerned. Germany feared that the 11 cor-
ridorn between Congo and German East Africa might prevent that 
German colony from serving as a commercial outlet for eastern 
Congo. In the end all was arranged satisfactorily. England 
consented to cancel the article (III) concerning the corridor. 
That satisfied Germany. France suceeded in leasing most of the 
Bahr-el-Ghazal district :from Leopold, thus leaving the imper-
ial road to the Upper Nile still open for France. Great was 
the jubilation in Paris. But the next year, l.larch 28, 1895, 
Sir Edward Grey, then under-secretary :for Foreign Affairs, in 
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~eply to a question in Parliament, made an inpromptu speech 
~ublicly and emphatically warning France that the whole Nile 
~alley was a British sphere of influence, and that the advance 
of any French expedition, marching under secret orders, into 
this region would be "an unfriendly act.n (1) This, in the language 
of diplomacy meant a threat of war. 
The Climax of the Drama: Fashoda 
A race for the Egyptian Sudan now began between Englanc 
and France, Italy having been eliminated by the disastrous bat-
tle of Adowa. In spite of Sir Edward Grey's warning, the em-
pire builders at Paris decided to dispatch Captain :Marchand, an 
intrepid French explorer, to lead an expedition from the French 
Congo, straight across the heart of Africa, into the Nile val-
ley. Simultaneously two other French officers were ordered to 
start with an expedition from Abyssinia, to meet Marchand on the 
N"ile. Menelik, coB perating with the French, sup:plied.five 
thouse~d Abyssinians to join in the march on the Nile. 
As soon as the news of the Adowa disaster reached Lon-
don, and it was realized that Italywas out of the race, the 
rsritish Government ordered Kitchener, the English officer who 
at that time was Sirdar or commander of the Egyptian army, to 
advance south from Egypt and occupy Dongola in the EgyDtian 
~udan. Kitchener's force was slow for he insisted on building 
a railway as he went to ensure his communications with his base 
of supplies. But Ki tchener' s caution vms :France's opportunity -
it was a race between a tortoise and a hare. 
1) Cf. Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-five Years, vol.I, p.l~ 
55. 
There are few exploits in history more thrilling than 
that of the French explorer Marchand. The distance from the 
starting :point in French Congo to Fashoda is five thousand 
kilometers, or as far as from New York to San Francisco - but 
through trackless tropical lends. Vii th about twenty ],renchmen 
and about two hundred natives he threaded his way through an un-: 
ex.:plored wilderness, dense forests and dismal swamps, braving 
fever and hunger. The journey took almost two years, but in 
July 1898, Marchand reached the village of Fashoda, on the Uile, 
and hoisted the tricolor over an old Egyptian fort. He soon 
grew alarmed, however, when he could find no trace of the two 
stronger French columns that were to have met him. These ex-
peditions had failed; one because it had no boats to cross the 
rivers and swam:ps, the other because of fever. But Marchand 
held fast to Fashoda, and made a treaty v:i th a local chief' for 
a French Protectorate over the left bank of the Nile. 
Meanwhile Ki tchener had been slowly :pushing southward. 
It had taken him more than two years, and he was still in the 
northern :part of the Sudan, fighting dervishes. In September 
1898, he won the decisive victory of Omdurman in which he slew 
tvrenty thousBnd dervishes. Entering Khartum, where Gordon had 
been killed, he avenged the events of 1886 by scattering the 
Iv~ahdi 's ashes. 
When he learned that a French expecli tion had taken 
possession of the Nile five hundred miles farther south, Kitch-
ener took part of his army and made haste to Fashoda, to find 
lLarchand and his tricolor. Their meeting and exchange of greet-
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ings and congratulations were very interesting. 1'hey agreed to 
refer the matter of possession to their respective governments. 
Courtesy vms observed despite enmity. 
In Englm1d the victory of Omdurman called forth a re-
markable au tburst of enthusiasm. 111\'i.oved far beyond their wont, 11 
says Winston Churchill, "the people sat themselves dovm to give 
thanks to their God, their Government ond their General. ' To 
judge by the press, the v1hole country had gone mad vli th the 
{1) 
lust of fighting gloJ~y. 11 1"hen, Yli thin a week, came the 
rumors of the French napparition" on the upper Nile. The pub-
llic, the press and even the politicians vrere furious. Liberals, 
Unionists and Tories all called upon the Cabinet to assume an 
unyielding attitude. The premier, Lord Salisbury, vrho often 
could be conciliatory, was firm this time. War was in the air. 
British naval }?reparations were pushed for·ward during the ·whole 
month of October, but with the deepest secrecy. It appears, 
however, that the channel sq_uadrons cruised off the French 
coast, ready to blockade the ]'rench battleships at Brest. .lu1-
other force \'latched the Straits of Gibraltar to prevent the 
]'rench Mediterranean fleet from coming out. In the l1!edi ter-
ranean itself a large sq_uadron was posted between Malta and 
Gibraltar, ready to blockade Toulon or to debark at Bizerta • 
.Another force was dispatched to Alexandria to guard the Suez 
Canal. A French critic expressed the opinion that aside from 
ship by ship counts (which never mean much), the British fleet 
was four times as strong as the French and stronger than all the 
1) \Vinston Churchill, The River War, II, p, 311 
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fleets of Europe put together. (1) 
As regards France, the Fashoda crisis could not have 
come at a more ino:oportune time. France was in the throes of 
the famous and dreadful Dreyfus case, ·with strikes, revolution, 
and civil war threatening. Under these circumstnnces the aver-
age Frenchman, never much interested in colonial affairs, could 
not be expected to take much interest in Egypt and the Sudan. 
Delcasse', the foreign minister, sounded out Russia for support; 
but received only the disappointing advice not to risk an ac-
tual break vri th England. His country was g_ui te unprepared to 
wage war, and Marchand's own position at Fashoda was most :pre-
carious. A conciliatory attitude was the only one for the 
French government to tru{e. Reluctantly, Delcasse decided to 
yield. Early in November 1899, he informed Salisbury that 
Marchand would be recalled. The main crisis was passed. 
After rather delicate negotiations, an agreement was 
reached and signed in the-form of an Anglo-French declaration, 
March 21, 1899, Vvhereby France agreed to seek no terri tory east 
of a line drawn between the Nile and Congo basins, and England 
reciprocally engaged to acquire nothing west of the line. This 
left the Egyptian Sudan, including Bahr-el-Ghazel, to England, 
but Frru1ce gained for her Congo colony free commercial access 
through this territory to the Uile, and, in addition, the king-
dom of Vfadai, in the central Sudan, was definitely assigned to 
France. It was further understood that Frro1ce was free to con-
1) Cf. William L. Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, II, p. 560 
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solidate her :power in the central and western Sudan and the (1) 
Sahara. 
In the next chapter we shall study more in detail the 
:progress of the Italian colonial policy. 
1) State Papers, vol. 91, :p.55 
P. T. Moon, Op. cit., p. 154 
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CHAPTER VI 
ITALIAN COLONIJU, ADVEN1URES IN EAST AFRICA AFTER 1869 
LEADll~G TO THE DISPUTE WITH ABYSSINIA 
The first attempt at colonization began in 1869. On 
November 15 of that year, an enterprising Italian ship owner 
Rubattino, by name, had bought the Bay of Assab from Eeheran, 
a sultan of Raheita, for forty-seven thousand lire from funds 
furnished by the government, in tending there to establish a 
coaling station for his vessels. The Egyptian government 
raised some objections to the occupation, but in 1880, Assab 
was permanently occupied. The Italian government had sent a: 
warship to help Rubattino in case the natives should oppose his 
taking possession of his purchase. On September 20, 1881 Be-
heran formally accepted Italian protection and in the following 
February an Anglo-Italian convention established the Italian 
title to Assab, and in July the Chamber adopted a bill con-
stituting Assab an Italian crown colony. 
Unrest in Egypt shortly afterwards compelled England 
to take drastic action to restore order in that country. She 
invited first France and afterward Italy to assist in this •. 
Both refused, to their eternal regret, for it gave England un-
disputed right to establish a protectorate over Egypt. Alex-
andria was bombarded by Eri tish warships July 11,1882 and 
order restored. 
:Massawa, in what is now Eritrea, had long been one of 
the chief ports of the Red Sea. It had for many centuries 
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formed part of the Abyssinian dominions, but was captured by the 
Turks in 1557 and retained by them for over two hundred years. 
At the close of the eighteenth century it was held by the Sherif 
of Mecca, and it afterwards passed to Mohammed Ali of Egypt. 
The Turks were reinstated about 1850, but in 1865 they handed 
it back to Egypt for an annual tribute of tvro and one-half 
million piastres. 
In 1884 some Italian explorers were massacred in that 
part of Africa, and early in 1885 Italy sent an expeditionary 
force - Great Britain being favorable - and occupied Massawa 
and Beilul, subsequently extending their zone of occupation. 
The extension of the Italian zone excited the suspicions of 
, 
John, negus of Abyssinia, and of Alula, ras of Tigre. On 
January 26, 1887 the Abyssinians twenty thousand strong, sue-
ceeded in surprising, near the village of Dogali, an Italian 
force of five hundred twenty-four men. After exhausting their 
ammunition, the whole force was annihilated; only one man es-
caped. Dead and wounded alike were horribly mutilated by order 
of Alula. 
The Dogali disaster produced consternation in Italy and 
caused the fall of the cabinet. Strong reinforcements were sent 
however, but due to siclcness in the Abyssinian army, and later 
the death of Negus John which was followed by a war between the 
successors to the throne, no nevv battles were fought between 
the Italians and Abyssinians for several years. 
The Italians, who had suffered the Dogali defeat at 
the hands of John, supported lfi:enelik with arms and ammunition 
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and in other ways. Menelik was not unappreciative, and, being 
an astute statesman, he realized that Abyssinia, if it was to 
avoid the fate of the rest of Africa, would have to establish 
close relations with one. of the great European powers. Among 
the Europeans, the Italians were the least dangerous. In May 
1889 he therefore concluded vii th the Italian agent, Count 
Antonelli, the famous Treaty of Uccialli, by which he abandoned 
to the Italians part of northeastern Abyssinia, thus enabling 
them to extend their possessions from the insalubrious coast 
area to the attractive inland plateau. 
Some of the more important articles of this cele-
lbrated treaty are as follows: 
"Art.III: In order to remove any doubt as to the 
limits of the territory over which the two contract-
ing parties exercise sovereign rights, a special com-
mission composed of two Italian and two Ethiopian 
Delegates shall trace with permanent landmarks a 
boundary line, the leading features of which shall be 
as follows: 
(a) The boundary between Italy and Ethiopia 
shall follow the high table-land. 
(d) From Adi Johannes the boundary between 
Italy and Ethiopia shall be marked by a straight 
line running east and west. 
"Art. VI: Commerce in arms and amrnuni tion to and from 
Ethiopia shall be free to pass through Massowah only 
for King .Menelik, who will be bound to make a regular 
application to that effect to the Italian author-
ities, furnished with the royal seal. The caravans, 
arms and ammunition will travel under the protection 
and under the escort of Italian soldiers as far as the 
Ethiopian frontier. 
"Art.VII: Freedom of travel and commerce. Armed men 
are prohibited from crossing frontier to intimidate or 
molest inhabitants. 
trArt.VIII: Freedom of commerce with natives in Italy 
and Ethiopia. 
"Art.IX.: Religious liberty guaranteed. 
11Art .XIV: Prevention of slave trade. No caravans of 
slaves to be allowed to pass through King Menelik's 
territories. 
"Art .XV: Validity of Treaty in whole of Empire. 
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"Art.XVI: Power of either :party to modify Treaty after 
five years, on giving a year's notice. Concessions of 
territory to be unalterable. 
"Art .XIX: Both Italian and Amharic texts of the 
Treaty to be 90:Q.Sidered official and of the same 
authority. n llJ 
Italy had supported Menelik's bid for the throne and 
had at his reQuest occupied Asmara~ thus being in a menacing 
:position for Nenelik' s enemy 'Mangasha, King of Tigr/ and nat-
ural son of John. It was Count Antonelli, then resident in the 
Shoa country, who at Menelik's reQuest :persuaded the Italian 
government to occupy Asmara, and it was he who made the Treaty 
of Uccialli with Menelik. It was ratified in September 1889. 
Italy recognized Menelik as emperor of Ethiopia, and Menelik 
recognized as an Italian colony the country in which Asmara lay, 
and which by royal decree of January 1, 1890 was called Eritrea. 
The Italian armies now :prepared to take the offensive against 
Menelik's enemies Mangasha and Ras Alula, who seeing further 
resistance to be useless, submitted to Menelik. 
The main point in the Treaty of Uccialli, however, 
lay in 11Art. XVII: His Hajesty, the King of Kings of Ethiopia, 
consents to avail himself of the Italian Government for any 
negotiation which he may enter into with the other :powers or 
(2) 
governments. 11 When the anti-slavery conference met at Brus-
sels Menelik made use of this article in reQuesting Italy to re-
present Abyssinia - an act which strengthened Italian illusions 
as to Menelik's readiness to submit to their protectorate. But 
1) Sir Edward Hertslet, The :Ma-p of Africa by Treaty, vol. III, 
p. 454. 
2) Loc. cit. 
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he afterwards ~retested against the Italian text of Article 
XVII and contended that the Amharic text contained no equi-
valent for the word 11 consent 11 , but merely sti~ulated that 
Abyssinia 11 might 11 make use of Italy in her relations with for-
eign ~owers. Count .Antonelli was dis~atched to settle the 
controversy, but found agreement im~ossible either with regard 
to the frontier or the ~rotectorate. Italy, therefore, author~ 
ized the abandonment of Article XVII, but was able in 1891 to· 
conclude two ~rotocols with Great Britain whereby the British 
government definitely recognized Abyssinia as within the Ital-
ian sphere of influence in return for an Italian recognition of 
British rights in the Upper Nile. 
Under the vigorous policy of Crispi's second premier-
ship, Italy's imperialistic designs in Africa were given new 
impetus. Successful attempts were made to push the Eritrean 
border further east toward the Sudan, and crushing defeats 
were inflicted upon lvlahdist forces in 1890, and upon Dervishes 
in 1893 and 1894. The effect in Abyssinia was to consolid~te 
Menelik's empire as never before. With the support of-France 
and Russia he completed his preparations j~or asserting his au-
thority as independent ruler of Ethiopia. On May 11, 1893 
Menelik denounced the Treaty of Uccialli to the Powers, but the 
Italian cabinet, now headed by Giolitti, was too occupied with 
internal affairs and paid no heed to his actions, and 1.\angasha, 
King of Tigre, came to terms with :r.=enelik. In December 1894 
a revolt broke out near the Tigrean border, but it was soon 
crushed by Italian forces. A quantity of correspondence was 
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also secured which established the complicity of Menelik and 
Mangasha in this revolt, which had been led by a chief named 
Bath-Agos. 
The Italian general Baratieri now undertook the con-
quest of Tigre' as punishment for its part in the revolt of 
Bath-Agos. He began his campaign in :March 1895 and the to·wns 
of Adigrat, Makalle, Adowa and .Axu.m, the holy city of Abys-
sinia, were occupied and garrisoned. After the rainy season, 
i.e., in September, Mangasha, :M:enelik and Makonnen, ras of 
Harrar, who hitherto had been regarded as a friend of Italy, 
now joined forces to repel the invaders. After a few minor 
successes for the Ite>lians, one of their columns, two thousand 
strong, and led by General Toselli, was almost annihilated by 
the Abyssinian vanguaxd of forty thousand men. Toselli and all 
but three officers and three hundred men fell at their posts 
after a desperate resistance. The rest of the army was forced 
to retreat to :M:akalle and Adigrat. :Meanwhile, Baratieri re-
ceived reinforcements from home, but remained undecided as to 
the best plan of campaign. The Abyssinians were nearly one 
hundred thousand strong, mostly armed with rifles end well sup-
plied. ViTi th artillery, whereas the ItalimLS, including camp fol-
lowers, numbered less than twenty-five thousand men. 
Baratieri's futile tactics exasperated the home go-
vernment, which on Feb. 22, dispatched General Baldissera with 
strong reinforcements to supersede him. Anxious, probably, to 
obtain some success before Baldissera's arrival, Baratieri 
with his council of war decided to attack the Abyssinian 
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forces. During the night the army advancep. towards Adov;a in 
three divisions of almost five thousand each, and each led by 
a general. A brigade of fifty-three hundred men under another 
general remained in reserve. Owing to mistruc~concerning the 
topography of the country, the various units were attacked sep-
arately by over·whelming forces and completely routed. The 
Italians lost forty-six hundred white troops, and nearly three 
thousand native soldiers killed and wounded, while almost three 
thousand :prisoners were trucen by the Abyssinians. Two of the 
generals were killed, one vmunded and one taken prisoner. 
Baratieri escaped i'Ti th the debris of his army, and :promptly 
dispatched telegrams to his government throwing blame for the 
defeat upon his troops. He was later court-martialled and 
severely reprimanded. 
The first incomplete news of the disaster reached 
, 
Rome on :March 2, and was released in a communique at 2:00 A.M. 
on March 3. The cabinet assembled at once and Crispi decided 
to resign rather than expose himself to the attacks of the Rad-
icals in the Chamber, which he lmevr to be unavoidable. Parl-
iament met on :March 5. The government's announcement of its 
decision to withdraw was met with cheers. Cris:pi and most of 
the ministers had gone to the meeting by circuitous routes to 
avoid the huge crowds that thronged the streets shouting,"Abas-
so Crispin, "Via dall'Africa 11 and occasionally even "Viva 
:MenelH:". The Quirinal and the foreign embassies as well as 
the government buildings were guarded by troops and shops closed 
because the restless mob was in an ominous frame of mind. 
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Despite the pouring rain the police were unable to clear the 
most important squares and thoroughfares. Not only in Rome, but 
in Naples and especially in the Lombard toims serious disturb-
ances broke out. Ministerial newspapers were burned in great 
bonfires, railroad tracks were torn up to prevent the depart-
ure of troops for Africa, stones were thro\m at the police and 
in some instances it became necessary for the cavalry to charge 
the mob. Italy had clearly entered upon a great and serious 
crisis. All the pent up discontent with government, with the 
dictatorial methods of Crispi, with the policy of colonial 
adventure found an outlet in the hour of national grief. It was 
to be years before the situation in Italy became stabilized, 
years before Italy was prepared once more to play a really in-(1) 
dependent role in international affairs. 
The new cabinet, headed by the Marchese di Rudini, 
at once began to sue f.or peace vii th Menelik, and after some 
difficulties a provisional treaty was concluded at Addis Ababa, 
October 26, 1896. This treaty provided for 
(a) The annulling of the Treaty of Uccialli; 
(b) Recognizing the complete independence of Ethiopia 
(c) A readjustment of the Italo-Ethiopian boundary 
line; 
(d) The payment to Menelik by the Italian Government o 
ten million lire for the release of the Italian 
(2) 
prisoners. 
1) cf. William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, vol.I, 
pp. 280,281 
2) Sir Edward Rertslet, Op. (}it., p. 458 
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Many of the released prisoners had been held for over 
a year, and stories of the mutilation of these captives are stilJ 
current in Italy. 
Rudini had always been an oi:)ponent of the Abyssinian 
enterprise. Looking back years later he confessed that the -
Italians had, in his opinion, gone to Massowa with no serious 
purpose and without realizing the difficulties. They had sim-
iPlY gone to keep.up with the expansion of the other powers, 11 in 
a spirit of imitation, a desire for sport and for pure snob-
(1) 
ism. rr 
:Perhaps the Adowa disaster averted one even more ser-
ious. The German secret documents show that before the battle 
of Adowa there was some danger that France and Russia might 
take· up arms to prevent Italy from conquering Abyssinia. Russia 
was keenly interested and prominent in the Abyssinian negotia-
tions, partly because of motives which the German chancellor 
keenly described in a dispatch to Billow: "Abyssinia has been 
made popular in Russia as a legend (referring to the legend of 
~rester John), yet behind the legend hides a real aim •.• l~e 
idea of extending Abyssinia to the coast under Russian protect-
orate, and making it a Russian base, such as England has in such 
!number, on the sea route to Eastern Asia, has gained new sig-
!nificance especially since the piercing of the Isthmus of 
(2) 
1
suez." Of course such Russian plans might not harmonize 
1) W. L. Langer, O;p. cit. , p. 281. 
2) Die Grosse :Politik, 11, number 2'766 
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perfectly with French designs, but at least both France and 
Russia were in accord against Italy. 
Menelik spent the next twelve years subduing surround-
ing tribes and consolidating his frontiers with foreign powers. 
Ras Mangasha of Tigre and Ras Makonnen of Harrar had both fought 
willingly with him against the Italians, but the former at 
least proved less tractable once the wro· was over. Neverthe-
less, Menelik succeeded in subduing him, as well as the tribes 
of the west and south as far as the frontiers of the Sudan on 
the one hand and the Ogaden district on the other. He also co-
operated with British troops in the campaign against the Mad 
Mullah. 
It was during this period that Menelik granted a large 
measure of autonomy, in return for an annual tribute and mili-
tary contingent, to certain tribes which had helped him, nota-
bly those from the Jimma territory. He also fixed his fron-
tiers with Great Britain, France snd Italy, the three powers 
controlling between them all the territory adjacent to Abyssinia 
With the exception of Italy, these frontiers remain from that 
time as they are to-day apart from one or two slight modifica-
tions. 
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CHAPTER VII 
FOREIGN INTERESTS TI~ ABYSSINIA 
Occasional reference has been made to Ethiopia's Eu-
ropean neighbors who lost no time in seeking openings for com-
mercial development. The British and Italian Governments were 
interested in the Abyssinian hinterland, and in 1891 and 1894 
signed three agreements defining their respective spheres of 
influence. Almost the whole of Abyssinia was recognized as 
belonging to the Italian sphere; this was appropriate under 
the Treaty of Uccialli, still in force when the first two 
agreements were signed. The third agreement, that of 1894, 
was unaffected by llenelik's unilateral denunciation of the (1) 
Treaty of Uccialli in the previous year.. 
In May 1902 certain concessions were granted to 
Great Britain by an .Anglo-Abyssinian Boundary Treaty ·within 
the so-called Italian sphere of influence. The Abyssinian 
Government promised: 
(1) Not to permit any construction which would di-
vert the Blue Nile, Sobat or Lake Tana waters from their nor-
mal course to the Nile. 
(2) To lease a site for a trading station (later 
fixed at Gambela) 
(3) To reserve to Great Britain the right to build a 
railway through Abyssinian territory CO!ll1ecting the Sudan 
1) The full texts of these agreements are found in IIertslet, 
op. cit., pp. 948-951 
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with Uganda. tl) 
In 1906, an agreement was signed between Great Brit-
ain, France, and Italy in which the whole question of spheres 
of influence was raised once more. In this so-called Tri-
partite Agreement, the powers guaranteed to maintain the status 
quo as defined in existing boundary and other treaties, among 
those mentioned being the Anglo-Italion agreements of 1891 and 
(2) 
1094, which were thus recognized as still valid. 
There were two main reasons for the three Powers bein@ 
able to reach the agreement outlined in this treaty. It was in 
1906 that llenelik's health began to fail, and foreseeing the 
possibility of civil war in Ethiopia if the Emperor's condi-
tion deteriorated, Great Britain proposed action by the three 
European powers most interested. This vras the first reason. 
~1he second was the pressure of German rivalry which was in-
creasing. A common agreement among Italy, France and England 
to preserve Ethiopia's territorial integrity ·would minimize 
the danger of a German advance. A clear statement of the 
respective rights of the three powers in Ethiopia, moreover, 
would prevent unfair advantage from being taken of internal 
disturbances by any one of them. 
Menelik reluctantly accepted the Tripartite Agreement 
subject to the understanding that Abyssinia's sovereign rights 
were not prejudiced. 
The Powers bound themselves to non-intervention in 
internal affairs: rtArticle III : In the event of rivalries or 
internal changes in Ethiopia the Representativeo of France, 
l) & 2) Ibid., p. 431 
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Great Britain and Italy shall observe a neutral attitude ab-
staining from all intervention in tho internal affairs of the 
country, and confining themselves to such action as may be, by 
common consent, considered necessary for the :protection of the 
Legations, of the lives and :proJ?erty of foreigners, ana_ of the 
common interests of the three rov1ers. In no case shall one 
of the three Governments interfere in any m~nner whatsoever, 
except in agreement v1ith the other tvm. 11 (lJ 
In order to solve the question of spheres of influence 
the follovring grticle was ·w:ri ttcn: 11.Article IV: In tho event of 
the status g,uo laid dovm in Article I being disturbed, France, 
Great Britain and Italy shall mru:e every effort to :preserve 
the integrity of Ethiopia. In any case they shall concert to-
gether, on the basis of the agreements enumerated in the above 
mentioned Article, in order to safeguard:-
(a) The interests of Great Britain snd Egypt in the Nile 
Basin, more especially as regards the regulation of the waters 
of that river and its tributaries (due consideration being :paid 
to local interests), without :prejudice to Italian interests 
mentioned in paragraph (b) 
(b) The interests of Italy in Ethiopia as regards Eritrea 
and Somaliland (including the Benadir), more especially with 
reference to the hinterland of her possessions and the terri-
torial co11 .. nection between them to the west of .Addis .Ababa. 
(c) The interests of France in Ethiopia as regards the 
French :protectorate on the Somali coast, the hinterland of 
this :protectorate and the zone neccssory for the constructiQn 
and working of the railway from Jibu ti to Addis Ababa. n ( 2 J 
There can be no doubt that each of the signatories 
of this treaty w·ould have preferred to see a modification of 
the :privileges accorded the other two; as a modus vivendi, 
however, it was the best understanding at which they were able 
to arrive, since it was basecl on existing agreements and did 
not reopen the question of the relative stro1ding of the three 
:powers in Abyssinia. It indicated a new relationship between 
the French and British in Africa. Only a few years earlier, 
while the Fashoda incident was still fresh in all memories, 
it would have been next to impossible to secure sn accord of 
. 1) & 2) Ibid.' pp. 440-444 
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this nature. The actual effect of the Tri~artite Agreement 
was to save Ethiopia from agressive penetration by any of the 
].JOwers from 1906 until 1934. 
These treaties, together with the ones listed.on 
pp. 29 & 30 and particularly those vii th Italy, have figured in 
the discussions that preceded the Italo-Ethio:pian war. It will 
be noticed that the Tripartite Agreement completely ignored 
the Italian defeat at Adowa and its consequences, and that 
France and England reaffirmed Italy's right to a sphere of in-
fluence covering practically the whole of Ethio~ia. But with-
in this sphere of influence, Great Britain and France were to 
enjoy the privileges accorded them by Menelik. 
British li~terests 
With these treaties in mind the various foreign in-
terests involved can now be briefly considered se~parately. It 
is clear from all the British correspondence relating to Ital-
ian claims "to the west of Addis Ababa" that the Lake Tana 
water supply is Great Britain's chief consideration in Abyssinia 
Subject to reasonable use of the waters in question by the in-
habitants of the region, the general understanding vli th Abys-
sinia, dating back to 1902, has always been that a darn should 
be constructed at the Lake in order to regulate the flow of its 
waters for the benefit of Egypt and the Sudan. With this end 
in view the Abyssinian and Sudan Governments had the Lake sur-
veyed in 1930. A further survey was made in 1933. On May 10, 
1935 the Abyssinian Governme11t invited the British, Egyptian 
and Sudan Governments to a conference at Addis Ababa with the 
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object of concluding an agreement on the question, but the Brit-
ish Government, anxious to avoid any step which might aggra-
vate the dispute with Italy, replied that it favored postpone-
ment of the matter for the time being. Meanwhile, the Egypt-
ian Government's five-year plan of expenditure on public works, 
approved by the Cabinet on May 22, 1935, sets aside twenty-
one million pounds sterling for irrigation projects which in-
clude the building of the Tana barrage. 
Other British interests are the trading station at 
Gambela, near the Sudan frontier, and the customary trans-front-
ier grazing of the British Somaliland·and Abyssinian tribes in 
the Ogaden area. Another important point is evident from the 
map. Almost two-thirds of Abyssinia's frontiers march with 
~ritish territory, Kenya, Somaliland, the Sudan, and trouble 
~ithin the country is bound to affect conditions along its bor-
ders. 
Great Britain's interests in Ethiopia are not con-
lfinecl, however, to purely economic considerations. The question 
pf its prestige is also involved. For several decades England 
~as enjoyed a predominant influence in the Red Sea, an important 
~ink in the chain of imperial communications since the Suez 
~anal was opened in 1869. Should Italy taJce possession of Ethi-
opia its position on the Red Sea would be substantially 
- strengthened and it might be a serious question whether British 
predominance any longer could be trucen for granted. Vfuen host-
ilities actually began between Italy ru1d Abyssinia, Great Brit-
ain lost no time in assembling a strong contingent of its fleet 
?4. 
in the Red Sea and adjacent waters • 
. Another staJce England had in this whole affair was the 
success of the League of Nations. One of the major preoccupa-
tions of the European powers since the Vlorld War has been to 
replace international anarchy by a system of collective secur-
ity. Great Britain shared this preoccupation. In the interest 
of general disarmament it sacrificed a portion of its naval 
power only to find itself, in consequence, less able to guaran-
tee the security of its colonies and Dominions. This would 
make it inevitable that in every crisis which affects British 
interests closely, Great Britain would appear as a champion of 
the League's authority. Advocacy of League action is, in fact, 
the logical corollary of disarmament. There could be only two 
other courses open to Great Britain. Either she must abdicate 
her traditional supremacy, allowing her Empire to disintegrate 
through a gradual process of attrition, or else she must resume 
direct defense of her own authority by rearmament and vigorous 
action. That the British people themselves were strongly in 
favor of supporting the League was shown by a popular ballot 
taken in the summer of 1935. ·The British foreign policy was 
therefore to uphold the League of Nations findings, (which 
mostly went in favor of Ethiopia), but the findings vmre con-
stantly met with Mussolini's threats thatnsanctions mean war.n 
Englnnd apparently did not feel strong enough to call liusso-
lini's bluff, or anyway did not want to take the chances in-
volved, and let Italy have its way with Ethiopia. 
Had Great Britain adopted a contrary policy, she might 
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have been obliged to face uprisings in other parts of Africa. 
Sympathy with Abyssinia was spreading ra~idly throughout that 
great continent, and racial antipathies would undoubtedly have 
become inflamed in British-controlled areas were it believed 
that Great Britain supported Mussolir~;i' s program in any sense. 
The power and influence of the League of Nations 
being in consequence of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute almost com-
pletely shattered, Great Britain had to turn to the other al-
ternative open to her, that of rearming, and that she is now 
doing with all her might • 
• 
French Interests 
The main French interest in Abyssinia is the Jibuti 
railv1ay, already referred to on page six. It is the, only 
large-scale European enterprise in the country. A French syn-
dicate in 1894 obtained a ninety-nine year concession for a 
railway from Jibuti to Harrar and between 1896 and 1902 built 
three hundred six kilometers of railway, of which ninety kilo-
meters lay in French Somaliland. Financial and political dif-
ficulties delayed further construction for several years. The 
French company had run out of funds with which to continue 
building, and British investors offered to assist. This aroused 
the French Colonial party, which succeeded in persuading the 
Government to grant a subsidy or five hundred thousand francs 
yearly for fifty years. When this came to llenelik' s ears he 
was incensed that a concession granted for commercial purposes 
should pass to the control of a foreign government, and refused 
to sanction the nevv proposal. In 1904, however, he authorised 
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the company to continue the railway to Addis Ababa, and con-
struction took place between 1909 and 1917 in which latter year 
it was opened to traffic. 
Under the Tripartite Agreement of July 6, 1906 it 
was agreed that a French company should complete and control 
the line to Addis Ababa and that lines should in the future be 
constructed from there to the Sudan under British auspices and 
to Eritrea and Italian Somaliland under Italian auspices. 
This Jibuti railway has given the French on the Som-
ali coast a position of distinct advantage as compared with 
their British and Italian neighbors. In r>rocess of time, how-
ever, it is inevitable that this line should lose its unique 
importance as motor roads and other railways are constructed 
in various sections of Ethiopia. It would not be a particu-
larly shrewd guess to predict that now with Italy incontrol of 
Ethiopia, Jibuti will be superseded in importance by neighbor-
ing Italian :ports. 
Financially the railvvay has had its ups and dovms, at 
times running with heavy losses and at other times with satis-
factory :profits. Internal strife and the World War seem to 
have been the main causes of the losses. 
On January seventh, 1935, H. Laval and Signor Ivlusso-
lini met in Rome to ntalk things over" and to settle certain 
outstanding colonial questions. Among the concessions to Italy 
1.vere two strips of terri tory, one ad,joining South Libya, and 
[the other the southern frontier of Eritrea, besides twenty-five 
~undred out of thirty-four thousand shares in the Jibuti-Addis 
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Ababa railway. 
Editorials in the press the world over surmised that 
some secret understanding had been arrived at, ro~d that this 
agreement was that France would leave Italy a free hand to deal 
vii th Abyssinia. lvl. Laval denied this before the Foreign Af'fairs 
Committee of the Chamber, but a change of attitude of the Ital-
ian press toward France would indicate the opposite. 
The future prosperity of Jibuti and its railway 
played, however, a very insignificant part in the shaping of 
French policies in the Italo-Ethiopian dispute. The great 
question overshadowing all others was this: if Germany should 
attack its neighbors in Europe, where could these neighbors 
find most immediate and most effective aid? 
Frro1ce, like Great Britain had a stake in the League 
system of collective security, and had also made sacrifices to 
maintain this system. But because of her acute fears of Ger-
man exp2nsion, she had also grovm to depend more and more upon 
a subsidiary system of bi-lateral and multi-lateral treaties 
of alliance, in the hope of securing prompt military aid in 
case of need. This servj.ce the League canna t render owing to 
the absence of an international police force. 
France would be in desperate need of both British and 
Italian supllort in case of another war ·with Germany, and con-
sequently cannot af:t'ord a policy which vlill alienate either 
British or Italian friendship. E. Laval accordingly devoted 
himself to the search for an acceptable compromise between 
British and Italian vievrs. His maneuvers certainly reminded 
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one of a man trying to ride two donlceys going in opposite dir-
ections, and were at times Glmost :pathetic. ~'here was the 
prospect, in case no com:promise could be found, that France 
would be forced to choose between its tvro neighhors. This 
would be difficult. Great :Britain is the stronger of the two, 
but her support of French policies has been fitful. In June 
1935, only three months after Germany's startling rearmament 
declaration, England signed a naval accord with the Third Reich. 
Furthermore, in another war, Germany is more likely 
to strike southward into Austria or Switzerland than westv-rard 
into territory close to the English channel. In such a cam-
paign Itelian assistance vrould be indispensable to France. Yet 
to sup:9ort Mussolini's policy in East Africa in the face of 
British opposition would be to pay en exceedingly high :price 
for Italian aid against Germany. No wonder France was in such 
distress in trying to decide which horn of the dilemma to 
choose, and making such strenuous efforts to escape both. 
Japanese Interests 
lviany people are surprised to learn that Japan has 
been the chief supplier of Abyssinian imports. In 1934 Japan 
supplied .sixty-two and one-half per cent of Ethiopia's total 
imports (chiefly cotton goods). Her interest in Abyssinian 
internal affairs was therefore only natural, and was twice re-
ferred to in statements by the Tokio Foreign Office spokesman 
in July 1935. That Japan must lose her EthiOpian market in 
case Italy took possession of the country would seem a fore 
gone conclusion, and the Japanese press as a whole reflected a 
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• 
pro -Ethiopian standpoint. 1m. Ethiopian :Problem Society was 
formed in Japan under the leadership of the reactionary leader 
l:l. Toyama, who cabled to Addis Ababa exhorting the maintenance 
of independence. 
The two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship in 
1930, but did not ratify it until an Abyssinian Minister 
visited Tokyo in 1932. The Italian press fre~uently commented 
on the growing menace of Japanese competition in Ethiopia. 
The remarkable growth of Japanese trade vias not accompanied, 
however, ba a corresponding attempt to establish Japanese set-
tlements in the country or to exercise special influence at 
the court of Emperor Haile Selassie. The sole weapon Japan 
used in capturing Abyssinian markets was that of effective 
price competition. 
It might be interesting in passing to compare Japan's 
volume of exports to Ethiopia (62.5%) with that of other co1lll-
tries. French Somaliland (15%) came second (chiefly salt), 
Europe (13.6%) third, then the United States (3.9%), Java (2%), 
and all other countries (3%). Of Ethiopia's exports in the 
same year, 1934, 66.6~b vvent to Europe, 24.2% to the United 
States, 8.7% to Egypt and the Sudon and only 0.5?11 to Japan. 
American Interests 
The United States has never had any interests in 
Ethiopia to speak of. The totals of American trade are neg-
ligible. At the time of the Italo-Ethiopian crisis there were 
only one hundred seven American citizens in the coUlLtry, most 
of them missionaries, who made little use of .American protection 
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during the war. The British Legation was the chief protector. 
As mentioned above on page seventy-three, an Amer-
ican firm, the J. G. Yfuite Engineering Corporation, made a pre-
liminary survey in 1930 and another in 1934, and obtained a 
$?,500,000 concession for construction of the Lake Tana dam. 
It was found that by blasting and excavations the ordinary 
capacity of the lake might be increased from three and one-half 
to eight billion cubic meters. This amount of v1ater would ir-
rigate all conveniently situated lands along the Nile for two 
years, even in the complete absence of rain. The advantage of 
creating such a reservoir is obvious. If a larger permanent 
cotton market can be established, the irrigation of hitherto 
U11cultivated lands in both Egypt and the Sudan may be the means 
of supporting in comfort a much larger population than either 
country yet maintains. Looking into the future England natur-
ally planned to make provisions for this expansion. Upon the 
suggestion of Great Britain, the concession was withheld for 
the time being, owing to the political uncertainty prevailing 
in Ethiopia. Meanwhile the Egyptian and Sud2!lese governments 
had reached an agreement with respect to financing the venture, 
with which it intended to proceed as soon as political con-
ditions became more settled. 
At the height of the dispute with Italy, when Haile 
Selassie was casting about to interest other nations in her 
cause, he granted an extensive oil concession, August 29,1935 
to the African Exploration and Development Company of Dela-
ware. This looked like a bid for lunerican interest and pro-
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tection, but the United States refused to become involved. At 
the reQuest of the State Department, officials of the parent 
company, the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company, agreed to relinQuish 
the concession before operations begen. Thus no American cap-
ital was involved. 
The United States had under these circumstances, and 
because it is not a member of the League of Nations, thus far 
concerned itself only with the Pact of Paris, neutrality leg-
islation, snd the oil concession just mentioned. 
Italian Interests 
Italian interests in Ethiopia can nov1 be briefly 
stated. The treaties of 1891, 1894 and 1906, described above, 
~ake it clear that Great Britain and France recognized Abys-
sinia as an Italian sphere of influence. Other than this it 
~ust be admitted that Italian interests were few. Her trade 
w:i th Ethiopia ·was not large. Abyssinian influence in Africa 
and in world politics was insignificant. Italy has complained 
that Ethiopia distributed concessions and government adviser-
ships to nationals of other countries, leaving Italians out in 
the cold, and giving them no chance for commercial enterprise. 
Italy has never specified what these concessions were, but has 
~sed this argument as chief proof of Abyssinian hostility 
toward Italy. 
It must furthermore be admitted that Italy or her 
!citizens have not always been alert to commercial opportunities 
~s the follovving example will show. On August second, 1928 
~as Tafari signed a Tt.·Tenty-year Pact of Friendship and Arbi tra-
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tion with Italy, (to be referred to later) . ( 1) .An accompany-
. t• ( 2 ) ".:l .:l f th t t• f t ~ng conven ~on :prov~~e~ or e cons rue ~on o a mo or 
road from Dessieh (one hundred fifty miles northeast of Addis 
Ababa and two hundred miles from the Eritresn frontier) to the 
:port of Assab in Eritrea. An Italo-Abyssinian company was to 
have a monopoly of the road traffic. Owing to differences of 
opinion between experts over surveys and estimates - the ac-
counts of the rival :parties differ as to who was to blame for 
this - nothing came of the convention. This was a source of 
mutual accusation and recrimination during the Italo-Ethio:p-
ian dispute. If this convention had taken effect Italy would 
have secured a footing in an important commercial enterprise, 
which would have increased the transit trade and thus the :pros-
perity of Eritrea. 
These are Italy's stated interests in Ethiopia; her 
real reasons are quite obvious, although :perhaps not stated 
officially. Her :primary reason is overseas expansion. Fascist 
Italy has undertaken a national drive for self-sufficiency, 
but there are two major needs which, in ]Jresent circumstances, 
cannot be satisfied at home. The first is an outlet for her 
:population; the second, the supply of raw materials, :partie-
ularly metals and fibres. 
Italy's :population is growing at the rate of half a 
million a year. Twenty-five years ago, t;vhen the rate of in-
crease was only half as great Italians migrated to the new 
1) League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 94, p. 419 
2) Ibid. , :p. 441 
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world in large numbers. To-day restrictions are placed on im-
migration by the United States and most other countries. Thus 
the problem of overpopulation and congestion has confronted 
the Italian government since the close of the World War. 
Neither the agricultural nor the industrial program 
of the Fascist government had solved entirely the problems 
raised by the rapid increase of. the population. JLussolini has 
encouraged the rearing of large families so as to prepare Italy 
for expansion in the world. He soon faced the logical duty of 
directing that expansion. By Italian colonization of fertile 
regions abroad, lvtussolini expects at once to enhance Italy's 
standing as a great power, to ease the problem of Italy's in-
sufficient food supply and to provide a secure market for 
Italian manufactures, as well as to give Italian manufact-urers 
themselves a permanent sup::;>ly of cotton, iron and other raw 
materials in time of war as well as in time of peace. Euro-
1peans had found satisfactory living and :production conditions in 
I 
! 
the highlands of Kenya, a constant reminder of all that Eritrea 
and Somaliland lacked, and of what the Abyssinian uplands might 
!
,offer in these respects. Here is to be found the chief motiv-
ation for the Ethiopian campaign. 
I 
I 
I 
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CH.AJ?TER VIII 
THE lliTERNATIONJ!.L STA~'US OF ETHIOPIA 
Reference has been made in the first few chapters to 
the internal situation in Ethiopia; the number of petty king-
doms into which the country vms S1)lit up, some Christian, some 
Hoslcm, and some pagan, all representing a wide variety of 
ethnic groups; to the feudal system which held full sway when 
:Menelik 1 s rule begr..n in 1889, and to the great problems of 
unification, slavery and regard for law ru1d order; also to 
the difficulties the central government had in extending its 
authority to outlying districts owing to poor communications. 
Jv~en tion was also made of the disorders that followed 1/ienelik 1 s 
death in 1913, caused mainly by the conversion to Islam of the 
emperor Lej Yasu. Due to the Great War, Ethiopia escaped out-
side in tcrference by the Great Po·wers, who were fully occupied 
elsewhere. When after much fiehting Lej Yasu was deposed in 
1916, and Henelik 1 s daughter nominally ruled the Jcingdom with 
Ras Tafari as regent snd heir to the throne, order was grad-
ually restored. 
After the Great \1ar, Ras Tafari had become uneasy 
over the attention paid at the time of the ?eace settlement at 
Paris to humru.1i tar ian q_uestions, among them the arms traffic 
and the slave trade in less favored countries. He noted that 
polemical articles in the :British press were directed against 
slavery in Ethiopia, but those artic~es omitted all allusion 
to continued slavery in territories under British control in 
Africa. He was also aware that the powers had failed to invite 
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Ethiopia to become a member of the League. Fearful lest some 
foreign po\Yer might take advantage of an o:pportuni ty to carry 
out expansionist designs, Ras Tafari took the initiative him-
self and somewhat abruptly in 1923 applied for admission to the 
League of Nations as a free and independent state on terms of 
equality with other nations. 
Before reaching the Assembly, the ap:plice.tion had 
been referred to the Sixth Committee, vrho appointed a sub-com-
mittee of seven, ( the British Empire, Finlnnd, FrGnce, Italy, 
Latvia, Persia and Rumania) to report back to the Sixth Commit-
tee. The sub -comr;d ttee reported that 
"(1) Abyssinia's sovereignty was recognized as she had con-
cluded treaties with several powers; 
n(2) the country possessed a stable government and well 
defined frontiers; 
11 {3) although it found itself unable to determine exactly 
the extent of the effective control of the central ~:mthori ty 
over the provinces remote froL1 the capital, it is of the opin-
ion that Abyssinia is fully self-governed, n 211d reconrnenc1ed 
that Trin order to assist Abyssinia to overcome the difficulties 
which may in the past have been the obstacles to such fuli'il-
ment11 the admission should be made subject to the signature 
of oertain declarations. 
The discussions on the Sixth Committee revealed tvro 
schools of thoueht; the one in which Great Britain, Svli tzer-
lancl ru1cl Australia were :prominent, felt that there vras need 
before admission, for a thorough inquiry into Abyssinia's 
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caJ_)~bili ty of fulfilling her undertoJdngs. The Australian 
re}!resentative said emphatically that he could not tolerate the 
prospect of being QUestioned by an Ethiopi&~ delegate as sn 
eQual ·with regard to- Australia 1 s administration of Hew Guinea, 
a territory where conditions were superior to those obtaining 
in Ethiopia itself. ~1e other school of thought led by France 
and Italy contended that admission vmuld pave the way to the 
abolition of slavery, and that the best means of strengthen-
ing the Abyssinian Government was to admit it to the League. 
Count Bonin Longare, the Italian delegate, further argued that 
no special sti}!ulations need be made with reference to the 
import of arms. 
The second view carried the day, and on September 28, 
1923, the Assembly unanimously by forty-five votes acce~ted 
( 1) 
Ethiopia as a member of the League. 
France had been the most ardent supporter of Ethio-
pia's ap}!lication for membership, and was in this filling a 
favorite role - that of a friend on whom the Ethiopians might 
rely for support in the face of Italian and British aggressive-
ness. Italy and ~1gland had at first been on the fence neither 
relishing the prospect of either admitting or excluding her 
from the League. The four QUestions vii th respect to which 
some Ullcertainty was expressed at the time of Ethiopia's admis-
sion to the League were these: was the central government ac-
tually in control of the whole country? could slavery be sup-
1) See League of Nations, Records of Plenary },Ieetings of the 
Fourth Assembly, pp. 124, 125; Minutes, p:p. 12-21 and 
Annexes 3-5, pp. 33-35 
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pressed? would the arms traffic be properly controlled? could 
reliance be placed on Ethiopia's good faith? 
Brief mention must now be made of Italy and her re-
lations to her allies, resulting from her joining them in the 
Great War, and her disappointing reward. 
As a result of Bismarck's astute diplomacy, Italy 
had joined the Triple Alliance in spite of her ancient hatred 
of Austria. When the World War broke out, ho·wever, she re-
mained neutral. Later she joined the Triple Entente and de-
clared war on the Central Powers. The so-called secret 2-Teaty 
of London was signed on April 26, 1915 by Great Britain, France, 
Russia and Italy, and it was on the strength of the promises 
of this treaty that Italy went to war against her former allies. 
Article XIII of this treaty read:-
"In the event of France and Great Britain increas-
ing their colonial territories in Africa at the expense of Ger-
many, those two powers agree in principle that Italy may claim 
some equitable compensation, particularly as regards the set-
tlement in her favor of the questions relative to the fron-
tiers of the Italian colonies of Eritrea, Somaliland ro1d Libya, 
and the ne~ghboring colonies belonging to France and Great 
Britain • 11 ll ) 
In November 1919, as 11part of a vdder negotiation of 
a colonial character 11 aris~ng out of the above article, the 
Italians proposed to the British Government that in return for 
Italian support of England's claim to carry out works on a 
barrage on Lake Tana, 'within the Italian sphere of influence', 
. . . . • and her claim to construct a motor road from Lake 
Tsna to the Sudan, Great Britain should support an Italian 
1) British Vfuite Paper, Cmd. 671 
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claim to 
( 1) a ,concession for a railway connecting Eritrea and Som-
aliland and running to the west of Addis Ababa, and 
(2) that Italy reserved to herself all rights in the Ital-(1) 
ian zone. 
It later transpired that nthis off'er was not enter-
tained at the time, chiefly owing to the strong objection felt 
to the idea of allowing a foreign po1ver to establish any sort 
of control over the headwaters oi' rivers so vital to the pros-
( 2) 
peri ty a11d even to the existence of Egypt and the Sudan 11 
Thus there had davmed for Italy at the close of the 
World War a period of disillusionment and dissatisfaction. The 
German colonies in Africa passed to Great Britain and France 
and the Union of South Africa, who proceeded to administer 
them under League mandates. And in spite of the promises of 
the Treaty of London of April 1915 just referred to, the only 
compensation received by Italy was a series of grudging boundary 
adjustments, chiefly in desert areas, in return for some of 
I which the Italians were expected to gren t further favors. 
Libya was slightly extended on its V1orious frontiers by agree-
ments of 1919,1925, 1934 and 1935. A strategically located 
morsel of French Somaliland was transferred to Eritrea in 1935 
along vd th twenty-five hundred out of thirty-four thousand 
shares of the Ethiopian railway (already mentioned on page 77). 
1 A few sq_uare miles of British East Africa passed to Italian 
Somaliland in 1924. This was all that Italy gained outside of 
1) League of Nations, Official Journal,Nov. 1926, p. 1519 
2) Loc. Cit. 
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l!.Ul'ope as a result of its participation in the war, while more 
than one million square miles passed under British and French 
mandatory control. These two nations explained that since 
Italy's chief service had been on the Austrian front, Italy had 
there gained territory far more valuable than the African re-
gions France and Great Britain might otherwise have allotted 
it. 
Italy had expected after the war to carry out an en-
ergetic program of road and railroad building in Abyssinia 
foreshadowed in the Tripartite Agreement of 1906. But the 
necessary concessions could not be procured without British 
diplomatic support - and Dovming Street for several years re-
mained cold. Not until 1925 when unrest was prevalent in Brit-
ish and French territories such as Egypt, South Africa, Syria, 
Turkey and Arabia, was there a change in British policy. It is 
entirely possible that Great Britain now saw advantage in an 
agreement which would placate the Italians, secure the British 
rear, reduce the danger of gun-running into the Sudan, and make 
it easier to face whatever contingencies might arise elsewhere. 
A series of notes were now exchanged between the Brit-
ish and Italians attempting to clarify the interests and priv-
ileges of each in Abyssinia. The British emphasized their 
rights to Lake Tana, the Italians their prospects of road and 
railroad building. These notes seemed preoccupied with ques-
tions of exclusive privilege, while the 1906 agreement was based 
rather on the principle of the open door. The Tripartite Agree-
ment made no differentiation between the urgency of British, 
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French and Italian ~rejects in Ethiopia; the 1925 agreement 
gave precedence to British interests, attributed second place 
to those of Italy, and seemed to ir·ply that France, whose rail-
way was already functioning, required no further attention. 
France resented this attitude, but allowed itself to be per-
suaded that Great Britain and Italy had no intention of over-. 
looking the legitimate interests of the Republic. 
Italy and England had made one fatal mistruce in de-
fining their interests in Abyssinia; neither in 1906 nor in 
1925 had they consulted the party most concerned, the Ethio-
pian government. Instead of winning the government's support 
to their schemes, they only aroused its suspicions. Ras Tafari 
scented a fresh threat to national independence and objected 
vigorously when the Anglo -Italia.'¥1 correspondence was placed 
before him. On June 15, 1926 he handed notes of protest to 
both countries. These were identic except that the note to· 
Great Britain added a rider ending: nwe should never have sus-
pected that the British Government would come to an agreement (1) 
with another Government regarding our Lake." 
He then sent copies of the notes to all members of 
the League of Nations, protesting that Italy and Great Britain 
intended to coerce Ethiopia, to the possible injury of her best 
interests. He succeeded in giving such publicity to the affair 
that the matter never came before the council, for both Great 
Britain and Italy made haste to publish their interpretation of 
!--------------------------------1l)The correspondence regarding this protest is found in the 
League of Nations Official Journal for November 1926, 
pp. l5l7-l527, the "riderlr is on p. 1520. 
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the agreement. The agreement, they said, does not imply coer-
cion; Ethiopia has a perfect right to judge what is for her 
best interest; the real intention of the note is to prevent 
British and Italian enterprises from competing with each other 
in the same areas. 
Ras Tafari was not convinced. He pointed out to all 
League members that he accepted no obligation to either Italy 
or Great Britain under the terms of their correspondence. It 
was a few months after 'this that he entered into negotiations 
with the J. G. White Engineering Corporation of New York 
(ignoring British companies) with a view to having the Lake 
Tana dam constructed by an American company. He also asked the 
United States to reoyen its Legation in Addis Ababa which had 
been closed since 1915. 
Britain took its disappointment over not having the 
Lruce Tana darn construction allocated to a British company 
rather philosophically, and entered into necessary discussions 
with the American corporation in a coBperative spirit. The 
American company, however, never carried out the Lake Tana con-
cession. It was offered at last to' Britain and Egypt in liay 
1935 while the crisis was at its height. But Britain refused 
it, lest her impartiality in the dispute he called in question. 
The incident regarding the Anglo-Italian notes closed 
with an assurance to Abyssinia from the League of Nations that 
reference would he made to her protest in the publication of 
the lmglo-Italian agreement in the official Treaty Series. 
Ras TH;fari 1 s success in checking English and Italian 
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ambitions in Ethiopia seems to have produced differing effects 
in Italy and Ethiopia. Ras Tafari seemed t.o grov1 more con-
fident of his power to maintain inde~endence, and more open to 
proposals for economic development by the grant of foreign con-
cessions. In Italy the effect was different. Rome was chafing 
at the delays caused by the terms of its agreement with Great 
Britain. A complete absence of progress characterized the 
situation in Abyssinia - the Italian sphere of influence! At 
all events, it seemed as if the Great Powers realized that 
the friendship of Abyssinia could be won only by a patient 
proof that they were trustv10rthy, and for several years they be-
haved to Ethiopia with courtesy and equality of manner. This 
was probably one of the reasons why the Fascist Government 
decided to enter into direct negotiations with Ras Tafari. It 
was at first delighted with the results. On August 2, 1928, 
the two countries signed a Tvventy-year Pact of Friendship and 
Arbitration (briefly mentioned on pages 82 & 83. Its three 
most important articles read:-
Art. II "Each Government undertekes not to engac;e, un-
der any pretext, in action calculated to injure or prejudice 
the independence of the other, and the two Governments under-
taJce to safegt.lard the interests of their respective countries. 
Art. III "Both Governments undertake to develope and 
promote trade between the two countries. 
Art. V "Both Governments undertake to submit to a pro-
cedure of conciliation and arbitration dis}?u tes VIhich may arise 
between them and which it may not hc>.ve been possible to settle 
by ordinary diploma tic methods, without ha.ving recourse to 
armed force. Notes shall be exchaneed by common agreement be-
tvTecn the two Govefr~ents regarding the manner of appoint-
ing arbitrators. 11 J 
An accompanying convention provided for the construe-
1) League of Nations Treat:y SeriE?~, vol. 94, pp. 419-421 
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tion of a motor road from Dessieh to the port of Assab in Eri-
trea (also referred to on page 83). 
It would evidently not be fair to throw all the blame 
for the failure to construct this road on the Italians alone. 
Expecting a steady flovr of exports end imports to pass over 
this road, Italy completed as g_uickly as :possible the section 
leading from the Red Sea coast to the Ethiopian boundary. But 
at this :point constrution stopped. Not a mile of roadway was 
built on the Ethiopian side of the :frontier. .All :progress was 
barred by disagreements between technical experts and by a 
series of :petty but effective obstacles placed by the Ethiopian 
Government in the way of Italian engineers and diplomatic repre-
sentatives. Neither blustering, arguing, cajoling nor the pres-
entation of handsome gifts - including new arms models - could 
move the Emperor or his officials. 
The Abyssinian Government made a new law that roads 
must not be built connecting with foreign territories unless 
they were first linJced to the ca:pi tal. A:pparen tly there were 
tvm reasons for this. One was that Italy's :purposes were con-
tinually distrusted at Addis .Ababa; the other was fear of inva-
sion. The southern terminus of this road would be one hundred 
fifty miles northeast of the caDital, facilitating invasion of 
Ethiopia from Eritrea, but not providing the Emperor 1 s forces 
with any corresponding ad van toge. Consequently, Abyssinia was 
in no hurry to fulfil her promises. 
In the meantime the year 1930 had arrived and certain 
changes had taJcen place in the Ethio:pian Government. Ras Tafari 
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~ad been crovmed Negus on October 7, 1928 and after the death of 
the Empress Zaudi tu in April 1930 he vms crowned Negus Hegusti o:r 
~peror, in November of that year, taking the name Haile Se-
~assie I.· During those two years (1928-1930) he had been deal-
~g with rival nobles. 
· It was during 1929 that Italy carried out a reorgon-
~zation of Italian Somaliland, and moved her outposts some _ 
sixty-five miles over the Abyssinian border into the province of 
pgaden to the fateful oases about Walwal. 
In August 1930, the Emperor entered into a tree.ty with 
Britain, France and Italy v1hich regularised his position with 
.r>eference to the trade in arms. This was necessary because the 
country remained the paradise of the rifle-runner. Abyssinia 
vas supposed to be within the Brussels Act prohibited zone of 
Af'rica, to which arms-producing States promised they would not 
~llow export. But European Powers who observe that law in 
~heir ovm territories, where there are risks of native risings, 
~9 not feel so scrupulous about an independent country. "The 
slave-raiders of Ethiopia could always obtain as many rifles 
as they could pay for - the British Foreign Office Handbook men-
tions the Italian trading station at Ginir as 'little used, ex-
pept as the centre of a contraband trade. in guns.' They cru11e in 
py the Jibuti Railway, too. The signature of the St. Germain 
ponvention by Abyssinia had no meaning, as that agreement never 
pame into force. In 1925, when the League of 
lrms Traffic Convention, Abyssinia vindicated 
bovereign state, to import the arms necessary 
Nations adopted the 
her right, as a 
for her defence; 
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and she was not included in the prohibited zone. But as this 
treaty shov1ed no sign of effective ratification, Britain, 
France and Italy signed a special Arms Treaty.n 
(1) 
The treaty provided that arms might only be imported 
into Abyssinia upon the receipt of an order signed and sealed 
by the Emperor or a duly authorised ldnister. As Britain, 
France and Italy held Ethiopia encircled in their territories, 
this treaty, if honestly carried out by their administrations 
in Africa, would completely stop gun-running. The :PoYTers 
agreed in return to permit the export of arms across their 
territories to the Ethiopian Government. Article IX stated 
that: . . . . "if the attitude or disturbed condition of 
Ethiopia constitutes a threat to peace or public order, the 
authorities of the adjacent territories shall refuse to author-
ise the transit until this threat has ceased to exist.n .An 
exception was made in the case of arms to the "legitimate" 
(2) 
authorities in Ethiopia "for the maintainance of public order.n 
1)· F. Vfuite, The Abyssinian Dispute, p. 25 
2) Documents on International Affairs, 1930, p. 195 
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CHAPTER IX 
THE W.ALW.AL INCIDENT 
In the yea:r 1934 trouble began in earnest for Abys-
sinia. Internally, there was no reason for this, for the Em-
peror was steadily, if slowly, consolidating his :power and mak-
ing it felt in the outlying :provinces. The immediate causes 
must be sought in Europe, where the international situation 
had deteriorated steadily since 1929. 
The world depression, and the reaction of economic 
nationalism which it :provoked, hit the commercial nations es-
pecially hard. Italy was among the worst sufferers; she had 
depended for long on international trade to support a large 
:part o.f her :population, and two thirds of that trade vanished. 
The energetic measures of the Fascist regime in encouragement 
of agriculture, :public works and 11internal colonizationn could 
not make up for the loss. l~oreover, Italy remained on the gold 
stande..rd, though vd th a gooa. deal of disguised currency manage-
ment. In 1927, vvhen economic conditions were favorable, liiuss-
olini had stabilized the Italian lira at 27.27% of its former 
value, whereas a few months later the French franc was stabil-
ized at only 20% of its former value. This reflected the con-
fidence felt by the Fascist Government in its own political 
future and the importance it attached to maintaining Italy's 
financial prestige abroad. 
The result of the high stabilization of the lira was 
that the purchasing power of the laborer's wages, already heav-
ily cut, v.rent dovm and dovm. When Italy finally was forced to 
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suspend the gold cover of the lira on July 22, 1935 the crisis 
had already become acute. Unemployment figures officially 
given at one million were probably much higher in fact. Trav-
ellers in Italy in 1934 and 1935 reported that the people were 
listless and apathetic, lacking in vivacity, and that remarks 
of discontent heard in the open street would not long before 
have meant prison for the speaker. Under such cond.i tions a 
war becomes a great temptation to an oligarchic government. 
It turns ill feeling against "the enemy"; it absorbs the. unem-
ployed; it creates a boom in v~ar industries. Altogether, it 
provides a first class distraction, especially if the war is to 
happen in a distant land and involves no risk whatever of in-
vasion for the war-makers. Is this an explanation of the 
change of Italian policy toward Ethiol)ia in 1934? 
But there are other reasons. There had been a lower-
ing of ·world morale. A series of rude shocks had been suffered 
b;y- international order. There was the Jap~mese invasion of 
Manchuria., a. calamity in itself. But far more calamitous, on 
a long view, was the inaction of the States Members of the 
League of Nations, which seemed to indicate that if a great 
po·wer went to war the other states would not fulfil their 
obligations under the Covenant. Vfuen Germsny left the League, 
and proceeded to obtain, by threats and unilateral dem1ncia-
tions of the Treaty of Versailles, what she had failed to win 
by the policy of fulfilment, the collective system was further 
damaged. The militarists everywhere were encouraged to think 
that there was nothing to prevent them from tearing up treaties 
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But in the final analysis the real cause of the Abys-
sinian war lies in the reasonings and will of the Italian dic-
tator, Signor M:ussolini. It would be a safe guess to say that 
if Italy had been ruled by her King Victor Emmanuel III, Abys-
sinia would not have been treated as she was, and Italy would 
have found other solutions to her internal troubles. 
The unmarked frontier with Somaliland :provided the 
cause of Italo-Ethio:pian hostilities. Since 1929 Italian 
troops had occupied a line of wells centering at Walwal. Italy 
declared that these were in Somaliland, Abyssinia that they 
were in the middle of the :province of Ogaa.en. The maps :pub-
lished by Italy u:p to 1925 and the London Times Atlas of 1920, 
bear out the Abyssinian contention, for they marl{ V/alwal some 
sixty miles west of the Somaliland border. Italy, hoYiever, 
went to v10rk and :published a ma:p which omitted the boundary 
line entirely. The fact is that in 1929 the Italian forces 
advanced beyond their former outposts, which were on the next 
line of wells far to the east, and took possession of the l'ial-
wal neighborhood, which was in any case, unadministered {:p. 95). 
Haile Selassie had also been tightening his hold on his out-
lying :provinces, hitherto ruled entirely by local chiefs ru1d 
nobles. 
In :pursuance of the Rcnnell Rodd Treaty of lf:ay 1897 
(:p. 29) an Anglo-.Abyssinian Delimitation Comm~ssion reached 
Walwal on November 23, 1934. Its business was the demarcation 
of the routes of nomad tribes grazing over the border from 
British Somalilcnd in the riorth. An escort of about four or 
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five hundred Abyssinian troo~s accompanied the Commission. The 
British Commissioner was Colonel E. H. lvi. Clifford, R.E. 
"At WalvJal there was a body of some two hundred 
Italian Somali soldiers under a native N. C. 0. , and an Italian 
~ost about a mile avray. The soldiers refused to let the Corn-
mission use the well or ~roceed on their business. The Abys-
sinian escort succeeded in ~ushing the Somalis back without 
fighting, until they got enough wells for their carn:p. The 
British and Abyssinian Commissioners protested at once to the 
officer commsnding the Italian troops that they had been ':pre-
vented by force from moving about freely in Abyssinia by the 
ItPlian authorities in the Walwal region'. The next day an 
Italian captain appeared. and met the Commission. 11 {1) 
From the account of the Commission the following 
excerpts are taken:-
11 (13) The British 1assion made every effort to arrive 
at an eg_uitable solution, but was constantly thv.;arted by the 
Ul1conciliatory and disobliging attitude of the Italian officer, 
·which may be judged from his remarks, several times repeated: 
1 Take it or leave it, ' or 1 Just as you please,' snd by the 
threat that in case of refusal he would send for 1 several hun-
dred soldiers 1 (not 'banda 1 ). 
11 (14) Just at that moment, about 4:00P.J,i., two Ital-
ian military aero:plcnes, Nos. S.0.4 and S.0.7, appeared in the 
south e.nd begru.1 to dive very lor;, fi:cst over the members of the 
commission, who were busy at the moment with Captain Cimmaruta, 
the Italian officer, and then over the camps of the two Lis-
sions, where the national flags v1ere flying and over the camp of 
the Abyssinian escort. 'l'his operation vias repeated several 
times. During its last series of dives, a mer:·ber of· the crevr 
of aeroplane S.0.4 was seen training a m~~chine gun on the mem-
bers of the Commission, their staff and their escort, who were 
vii th Captain Cimmaruta and in their respective cam:ps. . • 
11 ( 15) 'I"he British Commissioner thereupon expressed 
to Captain Cimmaruta his great indignation at this :provocative 
demonstration and announced that in order not to complicate 
the situation for the Abyssinisn Government, the British l.Iission 
would. retire to· Aa.o as soon as l)ossible. The Ar;yssinian 1/ission 
also expressed its intense ind.ignation, pointing out th2.t such 
a procedure on the part of the agon ts of a governn:en t vli th 
which Abyssinia had conc1ua.ed o. Treaty of Friendshi~ d~a. not 
appear to be in kee~ing with in terna tionP.l USf',,~e. 11 ( 2 J 
1) F. White, o~. cit., p. 30 
2) Leat,rue of Nations DocUJnent 049.1:.22, 1935, VII, :p:p. 17-19 
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The British Fission thereupon retired to Ado leaving 
the Abyssinian escort "in its position at Walvm.l in order to 
avoid ony ap:peal'ance of a retreat, which might cause a rising 
among the population of O~aden, seriously compromising the safe-
ty of the Commission." (lJ 
To the Abyssinian officer at Walvm.l the ItcJ.i2.11 com-
m8lldor addressed a series of notes v1hich v1ere increasingly rude 
and threatening in tone. ~~e British and Abyssinian commission-
ers drevi UIJ a joint report on these events and sent it to their 
respective governments. The Abyssinian Government aftervrards 
sent the whole correspondence to the League of Nations ·which 
published it. 
The Italisn o.ccount is that Walwal is a :place belong-
ing to Italian Somaliland, having been occupied by Italian 
troops for some years, ond that the Italian officer in command 
could not allow an Abyssinian Commission to advance in Italian 
terri.tory. 
11 The Abyssinian escort remained encamJ)ed over against 
the ItaliBn native troops. Feeling naturally rruL high, and in-
creased from day to day. On December 5, hostilities broke out. 
Each side says that the other began. The Italians by this time 
v1ere reinforced by aeroplanes and tanks. Some thirty Italian 
native troops were killed and sixty wounded, and one hundred 
seven Abyssinians ·were killed and forty-five wounded. The Abys-
sinians v1ere defeated and driven to the next well of Ado, 
bombed by aeroplanes en route. The Italiru.1s seized considerable 
loot. On December 8, an Italian aeroplane bombed Ado, where a 
rearguard was removing the wounded a11.d the bag§;age of the Com-
mission. Abyssinia d.eclares that Gertogab i was also bombed on 
December 28, but Italy denies this." 2J 
The Italian and Abyssinian versions of the incident 
are directly contrad.ictory. There were no impartial eye-v1i tnes-
ses :present when the clash took place; consequently it is hard. 
1) Ibid., :p. 18 
2) F. White, o;p. cit., 'D. 32 
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to determine who was actually responsible for the attack. Any-
way, each Government protested that aggression had been commit-
ted by the other. Abyssinia reQuested arbitration under the 
1928 treaty, but Italy refused to receive the envoy at Rome. 
Rome furthermore stated that the Walwal clash consisted of a 
sudden &~d unprovoked attack by Abyssinians on an Italian post, 
and that Ethiopia therefore unQuestionably was the aggressor, 
conseQuently there could be no QUestion to arbitrate. She 
demanded apologies from the Governor of Harrax, a salute to the 
Italian flag at Walwal, punishment for the offenders and twenty·, 
thousand pounds compensation for the dead and wounded. 
The Abyssinian Government could not meet these dem~ds 
first because it did not admit that it had committed agression, 
and in particular, because to salute the Italian flag at Walwal 
would be to admit that the place was in Italian territory. 
Two points were certainly sui table for o.rbi tration: 
1) The responsibility for the outbreaJc; 
2) The ownership of the territory in dispute. 
Abyssinia stated that she was willing to give repar-
ation if her responsibility were proved. 
The difficulty of settling the first point, on account 
of the absence of impartial witnesses, has already been mentione • 
The second point is easier to determine on account of two boun-
dary treaties made by Menelik; one is the .Anglo-Abyssinian Agree-
ment of 1897, the Rennell Rodd Treaty; the other the Italo-Abys-
sinian Treaty of 1908. Both are mentioned on page 29. The 
Rennell· Rodd Treaty states that there :iS an agreement between 
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Italy and Abyssinia as regards the boundary line between Ethio-
pia and Italian Somaliland, and that this line "runs at a dis-
tance of 180 miles pErallel to the coast of the Indian Ocean 
and joins the Juba to the north of Bardera. 11 This is sometimes 
called "Menelik 1 s line. 11 
In the Italo-Abyssinian Treaty of 1908 this statement 
is found: n •••• all the territory of Ogaden and all that of 
the tribes towards Ogaden shall remain dependent on Abyssinia. n 
Thus the Abyssinian case is simple. Walwal is over 
two hundred miles from the coast; it is also on the Ab-yssinian 
side of Menelik's line; it is also in the territory of the 
Ogaden. Thus by the agreements of both 189'7 and 1908, W'alwal 
is in Abyssinian territory and the Italians are guilty of 
trespass. 
The Italians have raised various arguments in defence 
of their action, as follows:-
(1) They had occupied the Walwal post for five years and if 
the Abyssinians had had proper control over this region, they 
would have protested long ago. 
(2) There have been an intermittent series of frontier raids 
and attacks on Italian subjects extending over many years. 
This cannot be denied, but Rome seems to exaggerate the facts. 
(3) Abyssinian forces had been observed to be massing in the 
Walwal region for weeks and even months, and their warlike in-
tentions were proved by documents f01.md in the Abyssinian en-
,campment after the Walwal flight. They argued that there was 
further proof of hostile intentions in that a force out of all 
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proportion to the normal accompanied Colonel Clifford's Mission, 
and did not withdraw w.i th him from the wells. 
(4) The Italians deduced an Abyssinian "agression 11 from the 
above facts , and. i'rom the Wal wal incident, and con tended that 
the question of trespass could not arise in relation to an 
undefined boundary. Their insistence on the need for settling 
the Welwal clash prior to all other discussions was based on 
the argument that to fail to do so would be to admit the dan-
gerous principle that armed attack is a legitimate method of 
dealing with differences on undemarcated frontiers. 
But there is a complete lack of evidence that the 
attack was perpetrated by the Abyssinian forces. 
It will be seen in the next chapter that the questions 
of trespass and frontiers soon ·were overshadowed by other and 
wider issues. Soon Rome changed the grounds on which it based 
its action, and began to argue in terms of Italy's right to 
colonial expansion and of Abyssinia's fitness to govern herself. 
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CHAPTER X 
THE DIPLOMATIC HANDLTifG OF THE DISPUTE 
A voluminous amount of diplomatic correspondence, 
syeeches, conversations, negotiations and agreements ( or rather 
disagreements) followed the Wa1wal incident. At times it looked 
as if a general European war could not be avoided. Earnest ef-
forts were made to preserve peace, and at the same time "save 
the face" of some of those involved, notably the League of Na-
tions. Only the high points of the ensuing dispute can be 
touched upon in this chapter. 
The day after the Walwal incident there began a series 
of verbal and va-i tten exchanges between the Abyssinian Minister 
'Of Foreign Affairs and the Italian Charge d'Affairs at Addis 
Ababa. Five Abyssinian and four Italian Notes passed between 
( 1) ~' 
them. Each side accused the other of unwarranted aggression. 
The Italian Government having refused arbitration on 
the ground that agression had been flagrant, Abyssinia on Dec-
ember 14th,l934 telegraphed to the League of Nations an account 
of the dispute concluding: "In the presence of Italian agres-
sion the Abyssinian Government draws the Council's attention to 
( 2) 
the gravity of the situation." No appeal was as yet lodged 
with the League, but Italian troops continued to advance, con-
siderably reinforced. 
After a series of Notes had arrived at Geneva from 
1) Found in League of Nations Document C.49.M.22, 1935, VII. 
2) Ibid. ' p .11 
105. 
both parties, revealing the continued refusal of Italy to con-
sider arbitration, Abyssinia on January 3, 1935 appealed to the (1) 
League under article XI of the Covenant. 
This Article reads as follows:-
"1. )Any wa:r or threat of war, v,rhether immediately affect-
ing any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby de-
clared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League 
shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to 
safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency 
should arise, the Secretary-general shall, on the request of 
any Member of the League, forthwith summon a meeting qf the 
Council. 
u2.) It is also -~ared to be the friendly right of each 
:Member of the League to bring t;-'the attention of the Assembly 
or of the Council any circumstances whatever affecting inter:-:-
national 
peace or 
! 
relations which threaten to disturb international 
I 
J 
the good understanding between nations upon which 
peace depends." 
The attitudes of ~e French and British Governments 
were of capital imyortance; The French Foreign Miri~ster, M. 
Laval, was at Rome from January 4th to 7th, 1935. It would 
seem that he was reluctant to oppose l~ussolini' s African ven-
ture. It will be remembered how France at this time favored 
Italy with East African boundary adjustments and Jibu ti railway 
shares (p. 77) French opi~ion also seems to have been moved by 
a frontier incident in French Somaliland on January 18th when a 
·--!)·.League of Nations·;;nocument, c 230 (1) M 114(1), 1935, VII,p. 
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Somali force and its French officer were wiped out by a raiding 
Abyssinian tribe. Abyssinia immediately promised compensation 
and punishment for this. 
The British policy was to urge direct negotiations 
between Italy and Abyssinia. With this in view, and also de-
sirous of preventing the Walwal incident at this time from as-
suming the dimensions of a major dispute, efforts were at once 
made to persuade Abyssinia to suspend her appeal. The,League 
Council was· about to meet, but Abyssinia agreed to postpone-
ment of considera'tion of her appeal until the next session of 
the Council in :May, and to undertake direct negotiations with 
Italy. This was announced from Geneva on January 19th. 
Misunderstanding resulted •. Italy seems to have felt 
herself free to renew her claims quite unmodified, Abyssinia to 
have understood .that the dispute would be arbitrated under the 
1928 Treaty (pp. 82 & 93). 
About this time Signor Mussolini assumed the post of 
Colonial Minister, in addition to the seven other ministries 
which he held. He sent General di Bono, who had advocated a 
forward colonial policy to Africa as Governor of both Eritrea 
and Somaliland. 
At Afdub, on January 29th there was another clash. 
This did not augur well for the future of the negotiations. 
There was some loss of life, heavier on the Abyssinian side. 
There were considerable forces facing each other in the Ogaden 
province. At the time, there was no Italian representative in 
Addis Ababa. Count Vinci finally arrived there about February 
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tenth. 
Meanwhile Mussolini kept on sending troops to Africa. 
Two divisions (about thirty-thousand men) were mobilized in 
February and sent besides large quantities of war material. 
Mussolini stated that these measures vrere 11precautionary and 
defensiven but Abyssinia protested to Italy against this dis-
patch of troops. The Italian Under-Secretary of Forei~l Affairs 
assured the Ethiopian envoy, February 13th that Italy had no 
aggressive designs. 
Meanwhile, the negotiations at Addis Ababa hung fire. 
Italy continued to demand reparations for ·walwal, and Abyssinia 
to refuse them except after investigation. Abyssinia withdrew 
most of her soldiers from the Walwal area, leaving only some 
three hundred men in the neighborhood of the Italian troo:ps. 
Italy proposed a neutral zone in that region, between the tvm 
forces, and Abyssinia consented. After much haggling an agree-
ment on the establishment of a neutral zone in the Gerlogubi-
Ado-Walwal-Afdub quadrilateral was aru1ounced on liarch 4th,l935. 
The position remained that Abyssinia demanded and 
Italy refused arbitration both on the dispute and on the boun-
dary questions. 
Abyssinia then invoked article V in the Treaty of 1928 
(p. 93) providing for the establishment of a Commission of Con-
ciliation. When Italy refused, Abyssinia (March 15th) acceded 
to all provisions of the General Act for the Pacific Settle-
ment;· of International Disputes, to which Italy was already a 
signatory (with important reservations). On l.Iarch 17th she 
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appealed for a s~cond time to the League of Nations. This time 
she invoked Article XV (and. also Article X) of the Covenant. 
This request never received any Leagu.e consideration. Part one 
of Article XV reads:- Hif there should arise between Members of 
the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is 
not submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement in accord-
ance vd th Article XIII, the Members of the League agree that 
they will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the 
d·ispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the ex-
istence of the dispute to the Secretary-general, who will make 
all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and con-
sideration thereof.u 
.Article X reads:- 11 The Members of the League under-
truce to respect and preserve as against external aggression the 
territorial integrity and existing po)itical independence of all 
Members of the League. In case of ru1y such aggression or in 
case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council 
shall advise upon the means by vvhich this obligation shall be 
fulfilled." 
In her apJ?eal to the League, Abyssinia stated that 
"in consequence of the mobilization ordered by the Royal Ital-
ian Government and of the continual disp2tch of troops and war 
material to the Italo-Ethio:pian frontier, there now exists 
between -Ethiopia and the Royal Italian Government a dispute 
. (1) 
likely to lead to a rupture.n 
At the Extroadinary Meeting of the Council, called in 
l)! League of Nations Document C. 126, M. 64, 1935, VII. 
109. 
April to deal with the French appeal with regard to German re-
armament, the Italian and Abyssinian representatives spoke. 
It was decided not to :place the dispute on the agenda, as it 
was due for consideration at the ordinary session in l1iay, and 
in view of' the fact that the 'declarations of' the parties both 
displayed peaceful intentions and a determination to apply in 
the spirit and in the letter' the treaty of' 1928. 
Meanwhile, negotiations between Abyssinia and Italy 
made little progress owing to differences regarding the per-
sonnel and the subject mntter of arbitration. 1'he notes ex-
changed in accordance i'li th the Treaty of' 1922 made it clear 
that the Conciliation Cownission should consist of four members, 
two appointed by each side. 1he nationality of' the nominees 
was not specified. The Abyssinians a.esired to appoint two neu-
tral "persons of great ind.eiJendence, high reputation and un-
disputed authority and ex1Jerience in the matter of' arbitration", 
and nominated. M. de la l~rad.elle, an eminent Professor of' Law at 
Paris, and. Mr. Pitman J. Potter, an .Americsn, and Professor of 
Political Science at the University of Hisconsin. 
The Italian Press for propaganda purposes took the 
iAbyssinian suggestion as an admission that Abyssinia could not 
find among her own nationals anyone of the necessary competence, 
and. therefore, as a proof of their contention that the Ethio-
pian administration was incapable as a vvhole. 
Italy wished to limit arbitration to the Walwal in-
cident, Abyssinia claimed that the subject matter Should be 
wider. Failing to reach an agreement on these questions, Ethic-
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pJ.a a eague on .ay 13th concluding 
as follows:-
nAt this critical hour in its history, the Ethiopian· 
Government earnestly appeals to the Council to see that the 
territorial integrity and political independence of Ethiopia, a 
ember of the League of Nations, are respected and preserved 
against aggression. 11 
Meanwhile preparations for actual hostilities went on 
apace, e.nd both sides condemned each otherTs warlike activities. 
The Italian press accused various European countries, notably 
Germany, Switzerland end Great Britain, of supplying arms to 
r
byssinia. 
It was clear that nothing further was to be gained by 
~ostponing consideration of the dispute. Consequently, the 
eague Council considered the Abyssinian case seriously, for 
the first time, at the 86th Session of M.ay 1935. Tr:Most of the 
1) F. White, op. cit., p. 41 
111. 
before August 25th or if they disagreed and-failed to appoint a 
fifth as chairman by July 25th, the Council was to meet. The 
Conciliation Commission decided to meet on June 25th, at Sche-
veningen in Holland. 
Despite this settlement, warlike :preparations contin-
ued on both sides. By June 1st, Italy had one million men under 
arms. Italy also reported "frontier incidents 11 from Africa. 
On June 20th a fresh Abyssinian note was sent to Geneva invit-
ing the League to send, at Abyssinia's expense, neutral observer 
to investigate the situation actually existing in the frontier 
,districts. 
Meanvrhile the British Government continued to take 
active steps to :promote a settlement, in the face of violent 
and untruthful attacks on the British attitude by the Italian 
:press, led by the editor of the Giornale d'Italia, Mussolini's 
mouthpiece. These articles declared that Britain had herself 
designs on Abyssinia. 
Mr. Eden went to Rome in connect ion rd th the .Anglo-
German Naval Agreement and held :prolonged conversations vri th 
Signor Mussolini on June 24th and 25th. One object of this 
visit was to ascertain Mussolini's attitude towards a tentative 
"British suggestion regarding the dispute: supposing Great Brit-
ain were to cede to Abyssinia the port of Zeila, together with 
a narrow corridor through British Somaliland, on condition that 
Abyssinia made certain territorial and economic concessions to 
I 
; Italy, vmuld Italy be :prepared to accept this as a basis for a 
!final settlement? To this inquiry :Mussolini re-plied in the 
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negative. 
This so-called Zeila Proposal unfortunately resulted 
in an estrangement between Bri te.in and. France. France, al-
ready upset by the Anglo-German Naval J\greement, feared that an 
Abyssinian trade route to Zeila might have competed with the 
Jibuti line. Also she took it hard that the British proposal 
had not been confided to her before it was made at Rome. No 
doubt this was because diplomatic confidences are apt to appear 
in the Paris press,- and it would have been undignified for 
Signor Mussolini to learn of an offer through a foreign news-
paper. But the coolness between Britain and France was a ser-
ious thing, when their co6peration was essential to the preserv-
ation of peace. 
The Conciliation Commission met at Scheveningen on 
June 25th as previously arrrm.ged; but got novrhere owing to dis-
agreements on fundamentals. Abyssinia insisted upon an inves-
tigation of all circumstances of the dispute; Italy refused 
to enter into any such discussion until the question of re-
sponsibility for the Walwal incident had been settled. She 
refused to hear the evidence of Abyssinia's French legal ad-
viser who wanted to prove that Walwal was in Abyssinian terri-
tory. To break this deadlock the Abyssj_nian rel;resentative on 
the Commission suggested the nomination of a fifth arbitrator. 
The Italians declined again and suggested a postponement until 
July 20th in order to allo·w the Governments time to deliberate 
in the matter. On July 14th and 23rd, Rome expressed in Notes 
to the Abyssinian Government its willingness to continue nego-
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tiations in the Conciliation Commission; but Abyssinia decided 
little or nothing was to be gained by this. It was clear that 
neither side was :prepared to cede its :point and that there \'laS 
no way out of the deadlock between the four arbitrators. 
On July 4th Abyssinia appealed to the United States 
Government to draw Italy's attention to her obligations under 
the Briand-Kellog Pact. The United States reply was non-com-
mittal. It expressed its concern for the maintenance of :peace, 
but did not refer to Abyssinia's specific request. On the fol-
lowing day it advised its one hundred twenty-five United States 
citizens in Abyssinia to be :prepared to leave the country at 
short notice. 
Falling back on the League Com1cil resolution of liay 
25th, the Abyssinian Government on July 24th :pressed for the 
meeting of the Council therein :prescribed. This council met 
on July 31st with Baron Aloisi, the Italian representative, 
:Qresent at the Council table. Three days of long and diffi-
cult negotiations followed. 1.:. Laval and I:r. Eden, vmrk-
ing in close coB:peration, took leading parts. 
The outcome was a compromise which was embodied in 
two League resolutions and a Three Power Declaration. It ruled, 
in effect, that the commissioners might not consider the ques-
tion as to whether Walvval was in Ethiopian or Italil:m terri-
tory, but must fix responsibility for the incident irrespective 
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I of the treaty rights of the :parties to the dispute. ~'his most 
I unusual ruling VTas adopted to satisfy Italian demands. It may 
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:Qutes threaten to disturb international jJeace. 
The Council made a concession to Ethiopiro1 demands, 
when it ruled, that in case of' another deadlock a fifth arbi-
trator should be nominated whose verdict should be final. On 
August 8th was anno1.mccd the personal acceptance by li. Nicho-
las Politis, the Greek l1:inister in Paris, of his nomination as 
fifth arbitrator. He was designated as such on August 20th by 
the members of the Commission. 11. :Politis we"s a famous jurist 
and League expert. ~"lith the aid of this fifth arb i trc tor the 
commission finally carne to a unanimous decision regardine the 
Walwal incident. 2.ney decided that neither party was to blame, 
since both had believed themselves to be fie;hting on their ovm. 
territory. Thus the Walvml incident vms elir:inated i'rom the 
scope of international discussion on September 3:cd, 1935 the 
day before the League Council JTiet to deal at length vri th Ethio-
:pio.' s a:p:pcals. 
The discussions begun on .August 15th betv1een England, 
France and Italy, represented by lflessrs. Eden and Laval F!lld. 
Baron Aloisi, proved fruitless. Vague reiJetitionB of Italian 
need for expansion seemed to be all Baron Aloisi Vl['$ author-
ised to say. The follovling day, negotiations r1hich lasted all 
day being finished, the French and British delegates forwarded 
to Rome :proposals representing the maximum concessions which 
they could offer; these pro:posals the Italian Government was 
asked to acce11t as a basis of ncgo tia tions. The two governments 
offered to"use their good offices" with the .Abyssinian Govern-
! 
j ment to secure rrvery wide economic op;;ortuni ties 11 for Italy in 
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Ethio:pia. 'l'hese they outlined in detail. Italy vms to be al-
lowed to make use of the :privileges :promised it in 1891, 1894, 
1906, 1925 ro1d 1928 but never yet enjoyed in :practice. Emperor 
Haile Selassie would a:p}ly to the League for economic, finrncial 
and adr;linistration assistance. England and Erance vmuld floc.t a 
loan 1'or the dovelo:;Jmen t o1' Ethiopia 1 s economic resources. 
Italy vrould carry out all cleveloin::ent projects, su:p}lying Ethio-
:pit'!. with foreign advisers or c.a_ministra tors. lire at Ih·i tain c.:1-d 
Fr&~ce would guarantee the security of Eritrea and Italian Sam-
alilro1d, ·whose e::-:::po sure to Ethiopian a ttaclc vms ostensibly one 
of the main rec.sons for Italy's :projected campaign. It VlaS 
:proposed that the necessary agree:c:J.ents should be embodied in a 
:B'our-PovJer Treaty between Great Britain, France, Italy and Abys-
sinia, which ·would taJ:e the place of existing agreements. The 
:principle of the tro:pen cloorn \'laS to be maintained, but it was 
proposed that the bulk of the advantages accruing from this 
should in practice be allotted to Italy. 
These offers were made subject to three conditions: 
(1) that the political integrity of Abyssinia should be re-
spected; (2) that the scheme of settlement in its final form 
should be freely accepted by Abyssinia; (3) and that it must 
have the a:pproval of the Lcatue Council. 
On August 18th these :proposals were rejected by lius-
solini. His counter pro:posals were quite definite. Italy would 
.. annex the lo'::lands of Ethio:pia and establish a protectorate over ~~~the highl~:.u1-ds. Italia.n tro~:ps in Ethio-}ia would guaron tee the 
security o~ Italy's neighboring colonies. ~--::: .. 
II 
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Neither Great Britain nor Italy was ready to compromise in the 
slightest degree. The issue therefore returned to the League 
Council UlLsettled. 
\~1en the Council and the Assembly met in September, 
!Mussolini still demanded a "to tali tar ian solution 11 of the Ethio-
!pian problem. He refused to discuss half -measures designed to 
!spare the pride of the Ethiopians and the nominal honor of the 
League while giving Italy the substance of what it desired in 
Ethiopia. The campaign now was imminent, and l'l:ussolini deter-
mined to conquer that country for a colonial possession. 
The attitudes of Great Britain and France, the decisio s 
of the Lea5~e of Nations after September 3rd,l935 and the actual 
warfare betv1een Italy and Ethiopia do not come under the scope 
of this thesis. 
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CH.AJ?TEH XI 
CONCLUSION 
With the outline of the foregoing chapters in mind we 
an now examine the cases of Italy and .Abyssinia and draw cer-
tc:in conclusions, or, c.t least, form ~orne :personal judgements. 
It is clear that the Italia11-Ethio:pian dispute vri th the war and 
the crushing of .Abyssinia that followed vvas not a local .African 
affair, that had no bearing on anything else. .ll.frica, the 
o:pean colonies in Africa, Europe itself, the Leag-ue of 1Tation 
and even the norld as a Yrhole were parties to the struggle. 
The realities of the situation are not alvmys so easy to dis-
en ta11gle from its a)pearances, for only too often are conven-
tional argwHents used to cloak motive. 
The Abyssinian case is QUite simple. It rests u:pon 
the ancient i:ndc:pendcnce of the Empire, a11d the rights of a 
eague liember State. That the country is backvmrd callllot be 
!
denied. Its ruler so adr,1i tted in a clig:nificd letter he VITote 
in 1926 to the League. Th:Lt it V·ms not rnar'chical. Under Haile 
Selassie it was more firmly ruled, and was making more :progress 
th811 for a generation :past. There was nothing in its recent 
history to invite or justify invasion. The incident at Walvial 
was unfortul1ate, whoever began the fighting. But it was Ethio-
pia, not Italy, who asked for enquiry into the facts from the 
! begim1ing and v;ho always declared herself willing to accept the 
decision of an impartial tribunal. Ethiopia asked the League 
Ito exruninc the whole situation between herself and Italy. She 
llB .. 
I 
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sions in order to l:eep the peace. When war broke out Italy vi-
olated the Covenro1t, the Kellog Pact ro1d the string of treaties 
from 1896 onward in which she had admitted the independence of 
Abyssinia. 
There have been perennial complaints from foreign 
nations that a certain capriciousness had marked Ethiopia 1 s pol-
icy in granting concessions for the development of natural re-
sources. The record of the past fifty years seems to justify 
their dissatisfaction. l1l.ost concessionaires have suffered 
heavy financial losses. For this there have been various rea-
sons. In the first place legitimate interests have been affect-
ed by the activities of unprincipled and irresponsible adven-
turers v.rho have obtained concessions merely for the sake of sel-
ling them at substantial profit to credulous persons in distant 
1ro1ds. In the second place, the Ethiopian Government, con-
scious of its weaJmess and fearful of being duped, has shovm. a 
reluctance to permit any foreign concern to enjoy success dur-
ing an extended period. 
Foreign legations at Addis Ababa have busied them-
selves with the affairs of reputable concession hunters, active-
ly supporting the ap:plicants w·hen they were their ovm nationals 
and often opposing them when they were not. This gave a poli-
tical tinge to all concessions, which increased Ethiopian dis-
trust of even reliable companies. 
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The majority of Ethiopian officials, high and petty, 
!had for many years exhibited a tendency to exploit conces-
£o:aires beyonaa-~~llit which furop:::~:: cap:~· of en_d=u.r=-=t~=== ll-- --- - II 
ing. They adopted an infinite variety of expedients to prevent 
concessionaires from deriving any profit whatsoever from mining 
rejects undertaken in good faith. This was done by increasing 
local exactions as production itself increased, by tampering 
flith the morale of laborers, or by revising concessions through 
fnilateral action so as to narrow their scope, making it ttnpro-
l:ritable to proceed with the enterprise. One of the most com-
1 
on sources of embarrassment to concessionaires has been the 
fficial habit of disregarding. the monopolistic features of 
rants. Although it was agreed in 1908 that no further mono-
olies should be established, it has been a freQuent practice to 
enterprises formal guarantees of immunity from com-
etition. Such guarantees have seldom been honored for long. 
That Italian control of Ethiopia would put an end to this state 
of affairs could probably be assumed. 
:But there is another angle from which to look at this 
situation. Ethiopia's caution in granting economic rights to 
illropeans is at least partly justified by the history of Africa. 
ce let ~Uropean planters and prospectors in and the native 
are doomed. They will be cheated or forced out of their 
they will be made to work for other men's profit in 
and mines, the demoralization of contract labor will 
eck their communities. When, in desperation, they tuxn and 
·resist, armies will come to reinforce the concesionaires and, 
~~lH.rd upon the soldiers' heels, officials will arrive. 1"1lat 
!· q 
It lmeans subjection. 
il 
Kings become the servants of vThi te clerks, 
jbd the whole people is degraded to'the status of an inferior 
II II 
__ IL.---· 
-rr---·-
120. 
Such a nation cannot develop naturally, according to its 
genius. As it grows in servitude, it dies. 
Haile Selassie, loaowing all this, could not admit Eu-
settlement unless he was fully assured that ns:pheres of 
· fluencerr did not mean conquest.. The story of Africa must have 
him to be on his guard. Furthermore, the Emperor, who 
~as an advocate of progress, claimed the right to reform Ethiopi ~rom within. He pointed to changes already introduced in the 
feven years during which he enjoyed relatively undisputed author 
~ty. These included the beginnings of constitutional govern-
! 
ent, the reorganization of the central army, currency reform, 
ax reform, and the employment of foreign advisers in important 
dministrative departments. These were on+y preliminary steps, 
1 Jhich were to be followed by opening up of roads and the consist-
;ent exploitation of natural resources with the more benevolent 
I 
~oBperation of better educated Ethiopian officials. This was 
hdmittedly a program which would require a long period of immun-
~ty from invasion and the continued exercise of forbearance on 
~he part of foreign enterprises within Ethiopia. 
Ever since the Walwal incident, the policy of the Em-
~eror has been internationally correct. His desire for peace 
~~ould not be questioned. It was essential for his own govern-
[ent, for Abyssinia was quite unprepared to face a Great Power 
~lith modern weapons. 
II Ethiopia had as much right to patriotic feeling as 
liany other nation. 
ll For over two thousand years their forefathers 
1! 
li had lived in and loved and died for this country, and it had 
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never been subject to foreign domination. International war is 
possible because rulers can call upon men to die in sacrifice 
to a simple and almost universal passion - the love of their 
ovm people and their own countryside. 
In a speech on July 18, 1935, the Emperor Haile Se-
lassie said the following to the Assembly of his notables:-
"It is better to die free than to live as slaves. 
Soldiers, follo·w the example of your warrior ancestors. Young 
and old, unite to face the invader. Your sovereign will be 
among you. He will not hesitate to shed his blood if necessary 
for Ethiopia and her independence. For forty years Italy has 
cherished the desire to conquer Ethiopia. We v;ere resolved to 
safeguard our honor, but we considered that a Government does 
not degrade itself by submitting to a ruling pronounced by an 
imuartial and qualified international body. We therefore sol-
emnly declared that Ethiopia would bow immediately and com-
pletely to any ruling against her if she were found at fault. 
Right up to the last moment we shall persist in our efforts for 
peace. If our repeated endeavors· and goodwill fail, our con-
science will be pure. God will defend the just cause of our 
country. n 
Patriotism cro~ be turned to the basest, or the noblest 
causes, It is one of the strongest forces in the world to-day. 
Fascist Italy, which has exalted it into a religion, cannot 
deny its validity for Ethio:pia. For in their right to and 
possession by, the great human emotions, the civilized and the 
primitive are equals. 
Intelligent Africans from any part of that great con-
tinent will admit, that white rule ·when it is good means schools 
and doctors, 
I 
and peace and a higher standard of living. But it 
11 is only good 
1! thtre are no 
1\ enterprises. 
I il I! the black man 
II II __i,L__-..::..:::~ .... " ' 
II 
where there are few or no white settlers, and when 
plantations and mines, or only strictly regulated 
Vlhi te colonization and white industry mean that 
loses the freedom to move in his ovm country, is 
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made to work for the white man either by undisguised forced la-
bor, or by taxation which he can :pay only by hiring himself out 
year after year. It means sweating in the fields for· the pro-
fit of the white, sweating in the mines where he is paid a 
tithe of what the white man earns i'or the same work. Above all 
it means losing ~is lands; a peasant people torn from the land 
in which its spiritual life is rooted must perisl!. Now the 
aims of Italy in Abyssinia are, precisely, colonization and 
mining. Small wonder if the spirit of rebellion, having smoul-
dered low for a while, might flame up when opportunities pre-
sent themselves. 
The power of white governors in Africa rests upon two 
bases; force, and administrative sldll. The element of force 
was for long the only one; it is still probably preponderant. 
But colonial government is now, vli th the advancement of civil-
ization considered a trusteeship, and native welfare the :para-
mount object. It is to be hoped that Italian administration 
of Ethiopia will prove a blessing to its inhabitants. 
1~e case for Italy is perhaps a little more compli-
cated than for Ethiopia, but not so complicated that it cannot 
be analyzed as to truth and falsehood in motives. It is fair 
to examine Italy's case as stated in her press and in various 
speeches by her leading men. It is as follows:-
d .Abyssinia threatened the Italian colonies, assembled 
l! ::"orces on her frontiers, compelling Italy to do the same. 
ij I! There ·were intertribal raids across the borders - of which the ,. 
,; 
II Walwal was the climax - and robbery of caravans, on roads in-
!! 
I! 
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fested by bandits. Italy must defend herself against such an 
enemy and such conditions. 
To neutral observers these arguments do not ring true. 
The Italian colonies were in no danger. The Emperor of Abys-
sinia was far too busy ruling his ovm country to attack for-
eign and more :powerful countries, and had more intelligence 
than even to :plan on such a thing. As to frontier raids, they 
are a nuisance, but they have no serious significance. Every 
district officer in those :par·ts should be able to co:pe with 
tribal killings, or he is incompetent. No administration can 
alter age -long customs betvve en one year and the next; and Som-
alis and Danakils raid into Abyssinia as often as out of it. 
The cure for highway robbery in Ethiopia is a matter of strength 
, ening the native government, and should be treated by expert 
hel:p, not by conquest. 
A second line of arguments used by Italy charges that 
Abyssinia failed to carry out the promise of the 1928 Treaty. 
She refused to make the Dessieh road. There were no Italians 
~nong the foreign advisers employed by the Emperor. Treaties 
must be fulfilled entirely or they are not b ina_ing. If Abys-
sinia will not carry out the pledge to trade with Italy, Italy 
is not·bound to kee:p the peace with Ethiopia. The railroad to 
the \vest of Addis Ababa that figured in treaties between Britain 
France and It[cly was a "right" v.,rhich Italy was entitled to 
I I claim, by force if need be. 
I 
l 
l ha:ps 
i 
I 
U:pon examination it will be found that there is :per-
more substance in the commercial grievance; but it must 
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be remembered that trade follows friendship. If Ethiopia had 
not so much cause to suspect the political intentions of her 
European neighbors, she almost certainly would have given them 
more economic privileges. Furthermore, Abyssinia clid not have 
much trade to offer anybody, and she did show little disposi-
tion to welcome Italiru1 goods. Japan sells cheaper cotton goods 
than any produced in ~urope, and a :poor country like Ethiopia 
must purchase in the best ffiarket she can find. 
Thirdly, Italy charges, Abyssinia is a barbarous 
country, with the social conditions of the Darl::: Ages in h"'u.rope. 
Her people practice unspeaJ::able cruel ties upon each other. Tvw 
millions of them are slaves. The ruling race is oppressive and 
m1just to the inferior races. Italy has a sacred duty to civi-
lize this bestial people; to free the slaves, to ta1:::e their 
pov1rer for tyrmmy away from the rulers, to lead them to the 
light. A League mandate should be eranted Italy to govern a 
people not able to stru1d by itself in the strenuous conditions 
of the modern WOl"'ld. 
These argurnen ts of Italy seem rather hy:pocri tical. 
The idea· of civilizing any co1.m try by means of modern war is 
sic1cening. No prir1i tive customs can com:pro"'e vli th the whole-
sale barbarism of bombing planes, poison gas ru1d machine gun 
I 
barrage. Gas ancl incendiary bombs were used by Italy in her 
1
1attack on Ethiopia, although she is bound by the treaty of 1925 
!:not to use poison gas in warfare. A Presbyterian missionary 
Pthus describes ru1 aerial attack on Dessye on December 6, 1935; 
L ll 11 The airplanes returned and dropped more bombs; houses were in 
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flames all around us, :people vvere fleeing here and there, some 
on steaming horses and mules, no one seemed to know what he 
was doing. I was not so calm myself. ]'inally the planes left. 
Then the ·wounded bee;ru.1. streaming in, feet and arms were torn 
off, breasts in shreds, ga:ping holes in bodies, eyes out, 
brains ex:posed, one man with his jaw gone; over a hm1dred. a:p-(1} 
peared in no time it seemea..n 
A:p:p2 .. rently the first contacts with Italian civiliza-
tion did not talce so well with the Abyssinian :people. · !·~oreover, 
Italy's enthusiasm for freeing slaves was of suspiciously 
recent·· origin. J:.:ven more suspicious was the :pious horror at 
the oppressions of the ruling race, voiced by a state which de-
nies all cultural rights to bUro:pean subject races in its own 
territories, gained as a result of the V/orld. War. Now v1i th 
Italy in :possession of the country, it remains to be seen whe-
ther the original ovmers of the most fertile lands in the best 
climates .can Jcee:p their :property or -vvhether they will be evicted 
in order to make room for Italian settlers. 
As a final argument for Italinn "rishtsn in Ethiopia, 
it is claimed that since Italy is a :poor country with forty-
two million :people crowded in a narrow, hilly and unfertile 
neninsula , she would have the right to :people the Abyssinian WI:' 
!ru:pland.s with her hardy, :pioneering :peasant stock, who could ex-
J 
il:ploit the resources, now lying unused, for the benefit of Italy 
Ilana. all the ·world. Countries like the United States, once 
n ___________ _ 
P1> ii 
l ~ ; 
J. L. Rohrbaugh, 2.'he Adventist War Work in Dessye, in the 
Advent Revie\'l and Sabbath Herald for April 30, 1936, :p:p. 
10-12 (Revie·w 8l1d Herald Pub. Assn., Wash., D. C.) 
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open to her surplus emigrants, are shut now. She was cheated, 
at Versailles, of the colonial compensation promised her by 
the Treaty of London of 1915. Other European states have taJcen 
. 
away the parts of Africa they wanted, vri thout asking whether 
the native people desired them as rulers. These states cannot 
criticise Italy if she follows their example. 
From an article in the Popolo d'Italia for July 31, 
1935 - said to have been vr.ti tten by Premier li!lussolini himself,-
comes this paragraph:-
nThe essential arguments, absolutely unanswerable, are 
tvm: the vi tal needs of the Italian people and their security in 
east Africa. The former of these arguments was admitted by 
the British Foreign Secretary himself. The second is a decis-
ive one. In 1928 Italy signed a treaty of friendship with Abys-
sinia, and Abyssinia, behind such a treaty, started the organ-
ization of her army. But instead of entrusting such organiza-
tion to Italy, she chose Swedish and Belgian officers ••• " 
These claims and statements need a few comments. The 
Belgian military mission arrived in 1927, not after the 1928 
treaty. TI1e statements regarding Italy's needs and her security 
in east Africa are the true motives of Italian policy toward 
Ethiopia. Italy has for a generation tried to establish nrights 
which would render colonization of Abyssinia possible. It is 
this which underlies the desire for an ncxclusive economic in-
lfluence" ·west of Addis Ababa - that is, in the plateaus suitable 
!l for ·white settlement - and for a railway which vmuld not be 
::economic, but vrhich would make it possible to garrison that 
p I! settlement. Such an ambition would be natural enough. But in 
'view of Italy's repeated treaty pledges to Ethiopia, it is a 
, legitimate one only if the settlement is done with the consent 
1of Abyssinia, and without infringing her integrity or diminish-
:; 
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ing her independence. It is perfectly true that other European 
~owers, like Italy, have helped themselves to African lands 
without the consent of the native peoples. Their aims and 
methods have varied from missionary enthusiasm to pure rapacity. 
:Sut they were not dealing with States whose sovereignty they 
had acknowledged by treaty, nor with fellow-members of the 
League of Nations. 
To argue that -~ticle JG~II of the League of Nations 
Covenant gives Italy the right to interfere in Ethio~ian af-
fairs is entirely off the point. That article, translated into 
essentials means this: where native institutions and authority. 
have broken dovm, owing to the commercial or colonizing pres-
sure of an alien race, it is necessary to install rulers also 
of alien race to control their ovvn fellows and to protect the 
backward :people for a period of wardship, until they are strong 
enough to look after themselves. Abyssinian institutions had 
suffered no such disintegration; she has shovm herself able to 
maintain herself for centuries; to hand her over to foreign 
rule and exploitation was to infect her with the very disease 
which the mandatory system intended to remedy. It was a mockery 
of the Covenant, not only in its articles on the integrity of 
its members, but also in its articles on trusteeship. 
The real aims of Italy, therefore, are trade and colo-
'.nization; her other arguments are prepared to satisfy a human 
·desire to feel that what man or nation does is just and right, 
ond no doubt, to evade the diplomatic awl.'"Vlardness of the truth. 
There is one more reason, not often mentioned, and :perhaps con-
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e D2ctator of Italy: the lust of conquest. 
Something should be said in defence of ' 
many of the Italian people, perhaps the large majority. They 
are amiable, friendly and social, not militaristic and often 
not politically minded. But they were fed on Fascist propa-
ganda. ~ublic opinion, in a totalitarian state, is so fettered 
by authority that it is hardly capable of movement. The at-
titude of the world reached the Italian people only through the 
hysterical distortions of the official press, which shouted 
that foreign countries miS1mderstood, insulted and were jealous 
of Italy. At the same time they took care to omit the sub-
stance of foreign criticism. 
Thus we find that Abyssinia, although in the past not 
wholly blameless in her relations with Italy and other Euro-
pean powers, proceeded in every way correctly and in harmony 
international law and the League of Nations Covenant in 
· er dispute with Italy. Ap"J)arently, then, the chief guilt lies 
vith the Italian Government. Whether the conquest of Abyssinia 
t1iH prove profitable to Italy and to Ethiopia itself remains 
Ito be seen. 
129. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Barnes, James Strachey, The Universal Aspects of Fascism 
(London: Williams and Norgate, l928) 
Bolitho, William, Italy under Mussolini (New York: The Mac-
millan Co., 1926) 
Budge, Sir E. A. Wallis, A Histor of Ethiopia 
Abyssinia, 2 vols. (London: Methuen & 
British and Foreign State :Papers (London: His Majesty's 
Stationary Ofi'ice, Harrison & Sons) 
Churchill, Winston S., The River War (London: 1899) 
Curry, Muriel, Italian Foreign :Polic~ 1918-1932 (London: 
Ivor l'Ticholson and Watson, 1932 . 
Finer, Herman, lJussolini's Italy (London: Victor Gollancz,l935) 
Gage, Rev. W. L., Abyssinia and the Emperor Theodore (Hartford: 
0. D. Case & Co., 1868) 
Gibbon, Edward, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire 
Gorgolini, Dott. :Pietro, The Fascist Movement in Italian Life 
(London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1923) 
Grey, Sir Edward,(Viscount Grey of Jfalloden), Twenty-five 
Years (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1925) 
Hear ley, John, Pope or Mussolini (New York: IJ.'he 1\:acauley Co., 
1929) 
· Hertslet, Sir Edward, The Map of Africa by Treaty, 3rd ed., 
(London: ;printed for H. M. Stationery Office by Harrison 
& Sons, 1909) 
Jones 1 A. H. M. and Elizabeth Monroe, A History of Abyssinia 
· \Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935) 
Kemechey, L., Il Duce, the Life 2nd Work of Benito lJussolini 
(London: t7i11iruns & N orga te, 1 935T 
Langer, William L., ~Uronean Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890; (N.Y.: Knopf, 1931) I 
l 
The Diplomacy of Imi)erialism, 1890-1902,2 V .' 
(N.Y.: Knopf, 1935 
League of Nations Treaty Series 1929 vol. 94 
League of Nations Official Journal, Records of the Seventh 
Ordinary Session of the Assembly, (Geneva: 1926) 
Ludwig, Emil, Talks with Mussolini( Boston: Little, Brovm 
& Co., 1933) Translated from the German, Mussolini's 
Gesprgche mit Emil Ludwig. 
Moon, Parker Thomas, Imperialism and World Politics (N. Y.: 
Macmillan, 1930). 
Mussolini, Benito, My Autobiography (New York: Chas. Scribner's 
Sons, 1928) 
Napier, Hon. H. D., Field Marshall Lord Napier of J,Iagdala~ a 
:Memoir by his Son (London: Bdward Arnold & Go., 1927J 
The Portu ese Expedition to Ab ssinia in 1541-1543 as Narrated 
Castanboso London: printed for the rucluyt ~ociety, 1902 
Pribram, Alfred Francis, Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920) 
Rey, C. F., The Real AbY:ssinia, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: J. B. 
LipJ)incot Co.) 
Robertson, Rev. Alexan9-er, 11~ussolini and the Nevr Italy (N.Y.: 
Fleming H. Revell Cor, 1928) 
Salvemini, Gaetano, The Fascist Dictatorship in ItalY: 
(New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1927 
Spencer, Henry Russell, Government and Politics o:f Its.lJ 
(New York: Holt & Co., l93l) 
, Tovmsend, :Mary h'velyn, Ori ins of Modern German Colonialism, 
: ( 1871-1885) (New York: olumbia niversi ty, 1921 
, Ward, Sir A. W. and G. P. Gooch, The Cambrid~e HistorY: o:f 
': British Foreign PolicY:, 1783-1919 (Newark: Macmillan 
· Co. , l923) 
'White, F., The AbJSSinian Dispute (London: League of Nations 
· Union, 1935) 
Woolf, Leonard, Empire and Commerce in Africa 
Wylde, Augustus B., Modern AbJSSinia (London: Methuen & Co., 190~) 
